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Abstract 
Prasangika Madhyamika philosophers claim that any causal theory that is bound up in 
the notion of essence (svabhava / rang bzhin) cannot offer us any plausible causal 
explanation of how things come to be what they were in the past, what they are now 
and what they will become in the future. This is because any notion of essence, they 
assert, fundamentally contradicts the interdependent nature of the causal process. As 
an alternative the Prasangika Madhyamika proposes the doctrine of 
pratityasamudpada ("dependent co-arising") as its central causal theory. The doctrine 
of dependent co-arising enables the Prasangika Madhyamika to reject a causal 
metaphysics of essence (svabhava) and adopt the view based on the inherent 
emptiness (sTinyatei) of the essence of causality. 
The objective of my dissertation is, therefore, to investigate how the PrAsangika 
MAdhyamika [non-essentialist] philosophy applies its twin concepts: emptiness 
(kinyata) and dependent arising (pratrlyasamudpada) in the case of causality. To do 
this, first I demonstrate the incompatible nature of causality and essence (svabhava) 
from the Prasarigika Madhyamika's point of view, demonstrate the grounds for 
rejecting the notion of essence by means of providing a detailed critique of the four 
traditional Indian essentialist causal theories. I, then offer a detailed discussion of the 
Prasangika's arguments in support of the doctrine of dependent arising as a plausible 
account of a causal explanation, and I achieve this by way of identifying emptiness 
with dependent arising. 
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Introductory Remark 
Three hundred years after the passing away of the historical -alcyamuni Buddha, around 
380 B.C. the monks of Vaigali allegedly violated monastic code of conduct by adopting 
ten new practices (Taranatha, 1990: 367-73). Consequently, a dispute arose between the 
conservatives and liberals over the matters related to the ten practices. This was the 
cause for the second of the three councils to take place. The venerable Yagas (P. Yasa-
kakandakaputta) mobilised a congregation of seven hundred monks, and presided over 
the second council (Taranatha, 1990: 68). 1 The position of the conservative prevailed in 
the council and the elders agreed to reject the ten practices. Vaigali monks did not 
accept the conservative ruling. They favoured more flexibility in the monastic rules. 
This controversy resulted in the split of the early Buddhist order into two schools, the 
Sthaviravadins and the Mahasanghikas. The former agreed with the conservative ruling 
while the latter rejected it. The initial split led to further divisions eventually as many as 
eighteen schools of thought with varying doctrinal interpretations took shape. Of all, the 
four schools: Mahasatighika, Theravada, Sarvastivadin, and Sammatiya emerged as the 
most powerful of their times. The dominance of these four schools was soon replaced 
by the four other schools: Madhyamika, Yogacarya, Sautrantika and Vaibhasika 
(Sarvastivadin) took ascendancy. The former two schools belong to Mahayana tradition 
and the latter two schools represent Hinayana / Sravakayana tradition. Sautrantika and 
Vaibhasika (Sarvastivadin) are Buddhist Abhidharmika realists as they categorise all the 
objects of knowledge within five basic categories: the material forms (Stk. rapa), 
'Both Bu ston and Tarandtha's accounts of the Second Council agree on most aspects, the former asserts 
that the council was organised at the Kusumapuri-vihdra under the patronage of King Nanda (Tibetan 
bga' byed), a Licchavi by birth, while Bu ston asserts that its patron was Agoka. There is however an 
interesting possibility. If the Tibetan term dGa' byed is the transliteration of Piyadasi, an epithet of 
Agoka, and if dGa' byed is misconstrued as different person, then the discrepancy between the two 
accounts is resolved. 
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primary minds (Skt. citta), secondary minds (Skt. caitta), compositional mental factors 
(Skt. citta-caitta-viprayukta-samsk&a), and the non-contingent, or unconditioned 
phenomenon (Skt. asamskrta) such as nibbana (space is also included under this 
category). Abhidharmikas are also "essentialists" / "foundationalists" in their ontology 
and epistemology, for they define ultimate truth either as indivisible phenomenon both 
physically and conceptually or as one that is causally efficient (Tib. don byed nus pa), 
while conventional is defined either as a divisible phenomenon, both physically and 
conceptually or as one that is causally inefficient (Tib. don byed mi nus pa). The 
Abhidharmikas, in particular, Sarvastivadins are pan-realists as they assert that the 
realities of the dharmas or entities of past and future exist in the same way as present 
dharmas. Moreover they propose an ontolology and epistemology based on the theory 
of svabhava, "essence" / "own-nature" which posits dharmas as possessing svalaksana 
"self-defining characteristics"of their own. 
Madhyamaka and Yogacara are the two main surviving schools that belong to 
Mahayana tradition. Historically, this tradition broke off from the Mahasatighika lineage 
by the second century after the Buddha. The various earlier developments, along with 
various doctrinal issues, culminated the rise of the Mahayana movement between 150 
BCE and 100 CE. While Madhyamaka and Yogacara (also known as Cittamatra) have 
their philosophical differences associated with a particular set of sutras (texts attributed 
to the Buddha) and kistras (commentaries on the sutras), both have the bodhisattvahood 
and Buddhahood as their complementary soteriologial goal. Yogacara is an idealist 
philosophy — it denies the reality of external objects but asserts the reality of mind only. 
Whereas Madhyamaka (its adherent is called Madhyamika) is founded by 1\agarjuna a 
south Indian monk. The Mfilamadhyamakakarika, the S'Ilnyatc7saptati, the 
Vigrahvyavartant, and the Yuktisa tstika are the most influential of Nagarjuna's 
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philosophical works. The School was made famous in the fifth century by the works of 
Buddhapalita and Bhavaviveka, both commentators on Nagarjuna's texts. Based on 
Bhavaviveka's interpretation of Nagarjuna's philosophy, a new Madhyamaka School, 
the Svatantrika-Madhyamaka, emerged (500 AD). In the sixth century, Candralcirti 
disputed Bhavaviveka's claims, vindicated Buddhapalita's reading of Nagarjuna's 
philosophy and founded a rival school, the Prasangika-Madhyamaka. Candrakirti's 
ideas are expressed in his works — especially his magnum opus, the Madhyamakavatara; 
its autocommentary, the Madhyamakeivatarabhatsya; and the Prasannapada, his 
commentary on the Malamadhyamakalcdrika of Nagarjuna. Almost two centuries later, 
aritaraksita and his student Kamalagila synthesised Madhyamaka and Yogacara ideas 
to form another Madhyamaka School, the Yogacara-Madhyamaka. 
Madhyamika is a ilnyavadin, one who propounds the doctrine of emptiness (Skt. 
iiinyata"). Madhyamika argues that every phenomenon is empty (Skt. s'anya) of essence. 
Madhyamika is an anti-realist or anti-essentialist in that respect and claims that notion 
of essence is utterly incompatible with the doctrine of Kinyata "emptiness" / 
pratilyasamudpada "dependently co-arising." Metaphysics, ethics and epistemology 
bound up by notion of svabhava is, Madhyamika claims, an utterly untenable position, 
hence it must be rejected in favour of pratityasamudpeida I s'Cinyata. Alternatively the 
MAdhyamika, in particular Prasarigika Madhyamika proposes empty metaphysics, empty 
epistemology and empty ethics as identical to the doctrine of pratilyasamudpada I 
s'anyata and further claims this doctrine alone can offer pluasible philosophical account 
of how things really are. Given the limited scope of the project, leaving aside the ethical 
and the epistemological concerns including the broader metaphysical considerations that 
arise from the Prasatigika MAdhyamika claims, the primary focus of my dissertation will 
be to investigate how the Prasatigika Madhyamika applies its twin doctrine of Anyata / 
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pratityasamutpada to the problems concerning causality. This analysis is significant for 
a couple of reasons. First, causality occupies a central position in Madhyamaka 
metaphysics yet to my knowledge, no detailed study has so far been undertaken in 
modern Madhyamaka studies and my work fills this critical need. Second, it is my 
personal interest to find out the implications of the Prasangika Madhyamika's huge 
claim that the notion of svabhava undermines any plausible causal account, and that 
only §tinya metaphysics, pratityasamutpada, can offer a plausible causal explanation. 
In order to achieve these two objectives: First I will demonstrate the incompatible 
relationship of causality and essence, and argue the grounds for rejecting essence in the 
interest of developing a plausible account of causality. This analysis will reveal the 
complementary relationship between causation and the emptiness of essence, and allows 
me to defend the Prdsatigika's claim that causal process must be empty of any essential 
power whatsoever and show why the notion of essential causal power necessarily 
undermines the notion of causal process. Second I will demonstrate the grounds for the 
Prasangika's claim that dependent arising is a plausible account of causality. This 
demonstration is critical for number of reasons. It will reveal the identity of the 
emptiness of essence and dependent arising, which is central to the causal explanation 
of the Prasatigika. Here I will argue that for the Prasatigika's claim that to reject essence 
is precisely to posit dependent arising, likewise, to posit things as dependently arisen is 
to deny that they are produced from any causal essence. The fact that the Prasatigika 
rejects causal accounts tied together with essence does not suggest, I argue, that it lacks 
its own causal explanation. The Prasangika's rejection of the essentialist account of 
causation, I argue, is identical to the advancing of dependent arising as its causal thesis. 
I will adopt the Prasatigika Madhyamika's method of presenation. In the first three 
chapters I will present the Prasatigika critique of the causal theories proposed by 
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orthodox (Sarnkhya), and heterodox (Carvaka /Lokayata, Jaina, Buddhist 
Abhidharmikas) schools of Indian thought. In Chapter 1, I analyse the Sartikhya's causal 
account which conforms, according to Buddhist tenet literature, "theory of arising from 
self," consider Sannkhya's arguments advanced to defend this causal claim followed by 
the Prasangika's critique of the arguments. Chapter 2 looks at the "theory of arising 
from another." Although this causal theory is popular amongst all orthodox schools 
(Nyaya-Vaigesika, Sarilkhya-Yoga, Purva Mimarnsa, Vedanta) of thought and Buddhist 
schools (Abhidharmikas [Vaibhasika, Sautrantika], Yogacara, Svatantrika Madhyamika 
included), my project will specifically focus on the arguments advanced by the 
Abhidharmikas to support this causal account, followed by the Prasatigika's critique of 
these arguments. Chapter 3 analyses the causal theories of heterodox schools of Jaina 
and Carvaka (Lokayata). Part 1 will look at Jaina's "theory of arising from both self and 
another," consider the schools key arguments in favour of this causal theory. This will 
be followed by a brief Prasangika critique of the Jaina arguments. Part 2 of the chapter 
looks at Carvaka's (Lokayata's) "theory of arising from without cause", consider the 
arguments put forward in favour of the causal theory followed by the Prasangika's 
critique of the arguments. 
Once the refutation of the essentialist account of causality is achieved in the first 
three chapters, then in the remaining two chapters I intend to explore the Prasangika's 
own account of causality, its case for dependent arising as the alternative plausible 
causal account. Therefore Chapter 4 will form the conceptual framework for positing 
dependent arising as the causal thesis for Prasangika philosophers. It discusses some of 
the major arguments as to why dependent arising and essence are seen as incompatible 
by the Prasangikas, arguing that the former must follow from the rejection of the latter. 
Finally Chapter 5 provides a detailed discussion of the Prasangika Madhyamaka's own 
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account of dependent arising by way of exploring the two central arguments — the 
subjective and the objective arguments — the school employs to demonstrate the 
uniqueness of the causal thesis of dependent arising and emptiness. 
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Chapter 1 
Theory of Arising from Self 
1. Introduction 
Of the four problematic causal theories briefly mentioned in the Introduction, the first 
chapter examines the first alternative, namely, the theory of self-causation. Etymologically, 
the Sanskrit term svatalj (Tib. bdag) refers to "from self" while utpada (Tib. skyes) means 
"to bring forth," "to produce," "to give rise to." Therefore the compound Sanskrit term 
svatalz utptida (Tib. bdag skyes) literally comes to mean "self-caused," "self-produced." 
The causal theory formulated on the basis of this view is therefore, variously known as the 
theory of "self-causation," (Garfield, 1995: 105, Kalupahana, 1991: 106), "spontaneous 
production," (Huntington and Wangchen, 1989: 158), and "self-production." (Huntington 
and Wangchen, 1989: 168). This theory is also characterised as the satkaryavada (Organ, 
1975: 201; Sharma, 1960: 151; Vacaspati Misra, 9. 77 [cited in Srivastava, 2004: 99]) 
wherein sat denotes "real" (Organ, 1975: 201) or "existence," ktirya "effect" (Sharma, 
1960: 151), and vada the "theory" or the "proposition" of that theory — literally, the "effect 
is real" theory or the "effect exists" theory which implies that the effect is real in its causal 
stage or the effect exists in its cause. This etymology follows because at the heart of this 
causal theory is the claim which states that the effect is pre-existent in the cause prior to its 
production. Putting it differently, it is claimed, the effect exists in its causal stage, 
therefore, the cause and the effect would exist simultaneously. 
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The advocates of this causal theory are the SarnIchya (Radhalcrishnan, 1998b et al.) 
and the Vedanta School (King, 1999: 217, Sharma, 1960: 256). The Sanakhya school is 
however recognised, amongst both the traditional ancient as well as the modern 
scholars, as its chief proponent. Between the Sarnkhya and the Vedanta schools, the 
main issue of contention is the ideology of the First Cause. The former proposes the 
supremacy of the unconscious primordial material Prakrti, (one of the ultimate realities 
composed of three constituents) which is said to drive the evolution and the dissolution 
of the psycho-physical world, whereas in the case of later, the primacy of the conscious 
primordial Brahman (the ultimate reality associated with its potency Maya) is seen as 
responsible for the creation, preservation and destruction of the world. Another 
distinction between the two schools concerns the nature of causality. For the Sarnkhya 
both the cause and the effect are real (Padhi, 2005: 195) whereas for the Vedanta only 
the cause is real; the effect is merely the appearance of the cause. Here it is evident that 
the translation of the term sat as "real," seen above, is problematic. It contradicts the 
Vedantins notion that the effect is illusory and unreal, mere appearance of the cause. 
What is real cannot be just an appearance. However, it still makes sense for the scholars 
to categorize these two schools under the umbrella of the same causal theory. Both the 
schools insist that the entire cosmological world, as the effect, emerges from one cause 
(self) and that the effect is pre-existent in its cause. The effect, according to the 
Sartikhya and Vedanta, is not produced from either dual or multiple causal conditions 
nor is the effect causeless, rather it is produced from itself. Therefore it is characterised 
as 'self-causation.' 
The aim of this chapter however is concerned with the theory of self-causation as 
championed by the Sarnkhya school. Because Sarinkhya is the main exponent of this 
causal theory, I intend to examine its philosophical arguments and their implications in 
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detail. (Given this as the primary objective of the chapter, a detailed discussion on the 
Vedanta's position on this theory is deliberately set aside). A clear presentation of the 
theory of self-causation calls for a brief cosmological account regarding the background 
of the Sarhkhya system, hence a brief account of the primacy of prakrti in terms of its 
participation in the process of origination, the evolution of the world according to the 
Sarhkhya. This will be followed by a closer examination of the five arguments advanced 
by the Sartikhya School in defence of their causal theory. The final section of the 
chapter will assess the weaknesses in the Sariakhya's arguments by way of presenting a 
refutation of each of the five arguments along with the Madhyamika's general critique 
of the doctrine of self-causation. 
2. Metaphysics in Sariikhya Thought 
The Sarhkhya system, founded by Kapila (ca. 100 B.C.-A.D.200) is considered as the 
oldest of the six orthodox schools (Sarhkhya-Yoga, Nyaya-Vaigesika, and Mimarhsa-
Vedanta) of the Hindu tradition. All the major Hindu systems are generally said to have 
either originated from or have been influenced by the ancient Upanisadic teachings 
(800-600 B.C.). Modern commentators such as •Radhakrishnan (1998a: 250), 
Mahadevan (1974: 202), have put forward the Chandogya Upanisad, Katha Upanisad, 
Pras'na Upanisad and vetcis'vatara Upanisad as evidence of the Sariikhya tradition's 
connection to the Upanisadic teachings. However, Varma traces the root of the 
Sarhkhya to the Vedas, and argues that there are clearly revealed distinctions between 
the Upanisad and the Sarhkhya traditions: "The Upanisads include idealism; the 
Saihkhya teaches realism. The Upanisads advocate monism; the Sarialchya teaches 
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dualism. The Upanisads accept theism; the Sainkhya is atheistical."(2003: 3 1 6) 
Emphasising the Vedic origin, Varma asserts the Sarnkhya ideas contained in the Katha 
and veta,s'vatara Upanisads indicates "the attempt of Upanisadic writers to bring the 
Sainkhya ideas into harmony with the Upanisadic monism."(2003: 306) Such attempts, 
according to Varna, only demonstrate rather an appropriation of the Vedic Sathkhya 
ideas to justify the Upanisadic monistic doctrine. 
Besides the problematic issue of the Sainkhya's origin, different interpretations 
arose concerning the philosophical doctrines of the Sainkhya school. For example Padhi 
writes: "The earliest Sankhya system, on the basis of Upanisadic suggestion, accepted 
'theistic monism'; later on the system was transformed to that of a combination of 
'atheistic realism' and 'spiritual pluralism.' Both the earlier and the later stages of 
Sarinkhya are however marked by realism." (2005: 193). According to Varma thinkers 
like Dasgupta, Deussen, Dahlmann, Keith, and Barua, all accept the Sdinkhya 
philosophy as theistic, monistic and idealistic, and they all claim the school originated 
from the Upanisadic tradition. (2003: 306) Varma himself however interprets the system 
as dualistic, naturalistic and gunavada (constituted by the three gunas), and claims the 
school owes its origin to the Vedas. Philosophers like Richard King (1999: 62-63), and 
Radhakrishnan (1998a: 250), on the other hand, grant both the Vedic and the 
Upanisadic influence over the earliest thought of the Sainkhya school. The proponents 
of the Sainkhya system also hold different views. On the account of the Sarrikhya 
Karikei composed by igvarakrsna (ca. 350-450 C.E.), one of the foremost exponents of 
the Sainkhya tradition, the Sariakhya system is treated as atheistic, on the other hand, on 
the account of the Patafijala-Sathkhya, it is conceived as theistic. 
However, Igvarakrsna is credited to have summarized and simplified the old 
system of Sainkhya thought. (Larson and Battarcharya, 1987:108). He composed the 
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Sarnkhya Karika, one of the seminal texts of the tradition upon which most of the later 
texts are based. Through his contributions, the philosophical account of the Sarbkhya 
school is standardised, made clear, more solid, and systematic. So in my discussion I 
will be taking the SCunkhya lairika as definitive representative of SaPakhya philosophy. 
From the era of the SCunkhya Karika, the system has generally leaned towards a non-
theistic dualism which is markedly different from the rest of Hindu philosophical 
thinking. While it proposes the two modes of reality, namely the Prakrti or (pradhana) 
("Nature" or "Primordial Materiality") and the Purusa ("Spirit", "Pure Consciousness"), 
it denies the existence of God. For instance, the Sariikhya Karika says, "No creator 
outside of the system - the gods are in fact transmigrating beings enmeshed in the higher 
echelons of the pralcrtic realm."(Karika, 53: King, 1999: 168) Along the same line, 
Radhakrishnan, in his book Indian Philosophy, argues "the world for Sarfildiya is not 
the act of a creator God, who summoned up in a single fiat of his will a world entirely 
distinct from himself," and insists that it "is the product of the interaction between the 
infinite number of spirits and the ever active prakrti..." (1998a: 248). 
3. Theory of Evolution 
The majorities of Hindu schools are theistic, and vigorously defend God as an eternal 
reality, the creator of the world. But as mentioned earlier, the SCunkhya Karika doesn't 
maintain God as the creator. So the question remains: what creates the world for the 
Sartildlya? The Sarhkhya provides the following response: it argues that the prakrti and 
the purusa co-jointly produce the world. The process of evolution of the world, it 
claims, does not occur without the presence of these two modes of reality. However, of 
the two realities, the prakrti is said to be the principle cause of the psycho-physical 
world. This is because through the Sarbkhya's causal metaphysics — the pre-existence of 
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the effect in its cause — implies that the existence of the world as an effect is already 
pre-existent in the prakrti which is its cause. And the existence of the prakrti, Sarnkhya 
argues, is extremely subtle and imperceptible, and therefore it is inferred only from its 
effects i.e., the world. 
The Sarilkhya philosophy has two major challenges in order to establish their 
causal metaphysics. First, it has to establish the existence of the prakrti, and then, the 
prakrti as the primary cause of the world. The latter is dependent upon the 
establishment of the former. This must follow because without providing the arguments 
for the existence of the prakrti its claim for the prakrti as primary cause would make no 
sense. So to prove the existence of the prakrti the Saritkhya Karikii (15-16) puts forward 
the following arguments: 
• That all the manifest things — all the products of the world — are limited, 
dependent, conditioned and finite whereas no limited thing can serve itself as the 
ultimate cause, hence it has to be non-finite; 
• That all the manifest things possess certain common and homogeneous 
characteristics which are capable of producing pleasure, pain and indifference. 
Moreover, the Sarilkhya does not believe that the differences in things are not entirely 
distinct from one another. It follows that they must have originated from a single 
ultimate source composed of three gwjas; 
• That all the manifest things, being themselves the effects, lack causal efficiency, 
thus presuppose the existence ofprakrti, the active causal principle (s'akt0; 
• That all the manifest things are effects, the effects are different from the cause 
because in the process of evolution, the effects are the manifests and the cause is the 
unmanifest. The effects, therefore, point to the cause wherein all the effects are 
potentially contained; and 
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• That all the manifest things have a unity in terms of being defined in ordinary 
space and time thus suggesting the one non-spatial, and non-temporal cause. 
From these five arguments, according to the Saririkhya, the existence of the primordial 
prakrti is inferred. Though the prakrti is the primal cause of the cosmos, the Sarillchya 
argues, it does not by itself complete the function of creating the universe. The prakrti 
depends upon the pure consciousness, purusa to initiate the process of evolution. In 
King's words: "The world is a multiplicity that has evolved from this primordial matter, 
but the motivating force behind the creation of the universe derives not from prakrti 
itself but from purusa." (1999: 64) The Satilkhya defines the prakrti as constituted by 
the three gurtas (tripartite constituents): sattva, rajas and tamas. Sattva, meaning, "real" 
or "existent" is, characterised epistemologically as intelligence, illuminative and clarity, 
and psychologically, as happiness and contentment. Rajas, meaning, "foulness" is 
characterised epistemologically as restless activity, and psychologically as agony, and 
pain. Tamas, meaning, "darkness" is characterised epistemologically as ignorance and 
psychologically as indifference or apathy. (Mahalingam, 2001: 162). Although the three 
constituents are characterised very differently, the tradition claims, they nevertheless 
work together to produce an effect, the world, just as the wick, wax and flame of a lamp 
cojointly produce the illumination. 
In the Sathkhya Karika-10, the prakrti is differentiated into two changing phases: 
unmanifest and manifest materiality. The unmanifest materiality refers to the prakrti's 
homogeneous phase — the stage before the evolutionary process takes place wherein 
three gunas (constituents), namely: sattva, rajas, and tamas ofprakrti dwell in the state 
of their equilibrium (samyavastha). In fact, "The state of rest is said to be the natural 
condition of prakrti." (Yoga Bhasya. ii 18, cited in Radhakrishnan. 1998a: 266) When 
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the gunas are in their balance order, the Sarnkhya argues, there is no interaction among 
them, and therefore evolution does not . take place. The second phase is the prakrti's 
heterogeneous phase, wherein the purusa comes in contact with prakrti. When this 
happens, the tradition explains, the former throws its reflection on to the latter. This 
then disturbs the state of prakrti's equilibrium which causes the interaction among the 
gunas of the prakrti. This in turn leads the evolutionary process to occur. 
According to Sainkhya's account, in the beginning of the evolution of the world, 
the sattva constituent of the prakrti receives a reflection from the purusa, which enables 
the sattva to dominate the other two gunas, and brings an end to the state of equilibrium 
of the three gunas. Once the unitive balance of the three constituents of the prakrti 
dissolves, the prakrti is said to produce its first evolute, mahat or buddhi ("the great" or 
"intellect/reason") which is characterised as cosmic and material but endowed with a 
psychical aspect. From mahat emerges the second evolutes, ahamkeira ("the principle of 
self' or "ego") possessing all three aspects: sattva, rajas and tamas. (Outlined in the 
diagram below) According to the predominance of the sattva, rajas and tamas they are 
respectively called sattvika, rajasika and tamasika. Out of the sattvika ahamkara, 
evolve the eleven organs — five cognitive sense-organs (ilianendriyas), five motor 
organs (karmendriyas), and mind (manas). The rajasika ahamkara does not produce 
anything in specifically but energizes the other two in producing their evolutes. The 
tamasika ahamkara gives rise to the five subtle elements (tanmatras). These five subtle 
elements dominated by tamas constituent generate five gross elements (bhatadi). 
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Tamasika Rajasika Sattvika 
       
1 
       
       
5.Manasonind)  
6.Eye 
7. Ear 
8.Nose 
9.Tongue 
10.Skin 
 
11.Mouth 
12.Arms 
13. Legs 
14.Anus 
15.Genetali a 
  
16.Form 
17. Sound 
18.Smell 
19.Taste 
20.Touch 
      
       
Fig 1. The Sarhkhya Evolutionary Theory Comprising 25 Categories of Phenomena 
1.Puraya 
(principle of 
Spirit) 
2. Prakrti (Principle of Matter) 
3.Mahat (Great Principle / Buddhi or Intellect) cosmic in 
nature,material but has a psycological aspect, made of finest 
matter and possesses qualities of luminosity and reflectivity 
which enable Buddhi to reflect Purusa. 
4.Aharriktira (Self sense or ego) Principle of self-
Identity,brings about awareness of 'I exist & 'I know.' 
According to relative predominance of 3 gunas, ahamlcara has 
3 aspects> 
21.Space 
22.Air 
23 .Fire 
24.Water 
25.Earth 
In total there are 25 categories partaking the whole framework of the Sarilkhya universe 
and its tripartite evolutionary process. However, not all these categories serve, the 
tradition explains, the same purposes. Hence four main divisions are made: 
• Puru sa is that which is neither effect nor cause; 
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• Prakrti is that which is not effect but cause; 
• Mahat, aharnkara, and five subtle elements are those which are both effect and 
cause; and 
• Manas, the five sense organs, the five motor organs, and five gross elements are 
those which are only effect. 
Here purusa is categorised as neither effect nor cause. Earlier however, it is argued the 
purusa does participate in the evolutionary process along with the prakrti. The Sarhkhya 
tradition does not see the two positions as contradictory. With the help of an analogy to 
explain the relation between the two ultimate realities, the system proposes the role of 
purusa as that of a magnet and the prakrti as iron where the magnet attracts the iron. In 
the similar manner, the purusa is said to move the prakrti by their proximity. 
(Srivastava, 2004: 92) This example illustrates, according to the Sarilkhya, that the 
purusa does not explicitly participate as a causal factor, however, its significance in 
initiating the process of evolution, as discussed earlier, cannot be denied either. 
Whatever is the case with the purusa, in the Sainkhya philosophy, the evolutionary 
theory is meaningless without a rationale and an appropriate establishment of the 
metaphysics of causation. The metaphysics of causality, on the other hand, makes no 
sense whatsoever with the exclusion of the prakrti. This follows because the existence 
of the prakrti, the Sainkhya argues, is implicit in the causal metaphysics, and that causal 
metaphysics is, in turn, implicit in the prakrti. This is to say that the understanding of 
two central philosophical themes of the Sarhkhya are mutually dependent. 
So having explored, although briefly, the significance of the prakrti in the 
evolutionary process, we now draw our attention explicitly to Sarnkhya's causal theory. 
First we will have a closer look at the arguments advanced by the Sarnkhya to defend 
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the theory of self-causation derived from the independent material basis (prakrti). We 
then critically examine the problems associated with the SAMIchya's arguments. 
4. Sathkhya's Causal Arguments 
Causality undoubtedly occupies the key position in the Sarilkhya's metaphysics. The 
causal theory known as satkaryavada, carries the meaning: "the pre-existence of the 
effect in its cause before the creation of the effect". As the meaning of the term implies, 
the creation of effect in the Sankhya's account, does not mean the creation of 
something entirely new, rather it implies a manifestation of the unmanifest effect, the 
transformation of the potentiality into the actuality. This is to claim that the effect 
underlies the causal materiality of the prakrti before gaining the actual status of the 
effect. The Sarilkhya Karikii 9 advances five arguments to defend this conception of 
causality. The argument reads: the effect exists before the operation of cause, because: 
1) something cannot arise from nothing; 
2) any effect requires a material basis (upaclaria); 
3) anything cannot just arise from just everything; 
4) something can only produce what it is capable of producing; and 
5) the very nature or essence of the cause is non-different from the effect. (Cited in 
Larson, 1987: 153) 
The majority of modern commentators on the Sarnkhya's causation including 
Radhakrishnan (1998: 202); Koller (2002: 55-57); Shaw (2005: 3-8); Srivastava (2004: 
99-100) have drawn the five arguments from the Scrinkhya Karikit of Igvaralq-sna. All 
the commentators seemed to have no problem in assuming the authority of Igvarakrsna 
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as one of the foremost exponents of the Sariikhya succeeding Kapila, Asuri 2 and 
Paficagikha. 3 (ca. 100 B.C.E-200 C.E.) 
For a detailed analysis of each of these five arguments, we turn to them one by 
one. The first argument of Sankhya states that the effect exists before the operation of 
cause because something cannot arise from nothing. (SCunkhya Kiirika, 9) Putting it 
differently the effect must exist prior to the operation of cause because "The nonexistent 
cannot be the object of any activity." (Radhakrishnan, 1998a: 256) This argument is 
premised on the assumption that for something to be a cause, it must pre-exist. Such 
that an entity that is not existent prior to its effect cannot produce its effect. To be able 
to produce is to pre-exist in its causal stage. For instance, the horns on a rabbit and hairs 
on a turtle are not subjected to causal conditions. As such they cannot produce any 
effect, since the causal potential in them is nonexistent. They are nonexistent and unreal. 
On those grounds, the Sariakhya insists if the effect is non-existent in its cause then 
nothing can bring it into existence out of its cause. If the effect does not exist during the 
causal stage, there would be no cause at all since the cause is contained within the effect 
simultaneously. Likewise, if there are effects there must be causes too. From this it 
follows what is nonexistent in the cause cannot be brought into existence as an effect. 
"Blue," says Vacaspati Mira "cannot be changed into yellow even by a thousand 
artists." (Sarilkhya-Tattva-Kaumadt, 9.70; cited in Srivastava, 2004: 99) 
The second argument says: The effect exists before the operation of cause because 
any effect requires a material basis (upaclana). Putting the argument in 
Radhakrishnan's words, "The product is not different from the material of which it is 
2 A Brahmin householder (grhastha) who later became the foremost disciple of Kapila, the founder of the 
Sarbkhya tradition.(Larson and Battarcharya, 1987: 108) 
3  A revered teacher for both the Sthilkhya and Yoga tradition and considered as the key figure who later 
consolidated, "expanded" or "widely" disseminated the tradition. (Scitiikhya Karika 70 ) (Cited in Larson 
and Battarcharya, 1987: 113-114) 
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composed."(1998a: 257) This argument highlights the definite relationship between the 
effect and its material cause (upadana karana), implying that prakrti, the prime material 
cause, is not different from the evolutes. They all rest in prakrti prior to their 
manifestation and latter dissolve into the prakrti itself. In Sharma's word, "The effect is 
only a manifestation of its material cause, because it is invariably connected with it." 
(1960: 152) It is like that of milk and yoghurt. Though yoghurt has distinct form as 
compared to milk, none can claim that they are totally different as there is a definite 
causal link between the two — milk must pre-exist for the yogurt to come into existence. 
And the third argument emphasises the specific relation between the effect and the 
cause. Shaw points out from this argument that an effect cannot be said to be an 
unrelated entity. Each effect must follow from certain specific conditions, these 
conditions are pre-existent, otherwise anything could arise from anything. The effect 
exists before the operation of cause because anything cannot just arise from just 
everything. Clarifying the argument, Radhakrishnan says, "It (effect) exists before it 
comes into being in the shape of the material. If this is not admitted, then anything can 
come out of anything." (1998a: 257). For exponents of the Satilkhya school, the fact that 
it is impossible for all things coming from all things proves the existence of the effect 
before the operation of cause. 
The fourth argument states: The effect exists before the operation of cause 
because something can only produce what it is capable of producing. In 
Radhalcrishnan's words this implies: "Causal efficiency belongs to that which has the 
necessary potency." (1998a: 257) The argument emphasizes the causal potentiality 
(s'akti) of the specific cause to manifest the specific effect. If it is not related in that 
manner then anything can come out of anything. Metaphorically this argument can be 
illustrated as follows: oil must pre-exist in the sesame seed, without which the sesame 
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seed would not be able to produce the oil. If however, it is the case that effect is not pre-
existent in the cause then there would not be any justification for the sesame seed 
producing oil. The pebbles and sesame seed would equally produce oil. 
The fifth argument states: The effect exists before the operation of cause because 
the very nature or essence of the cause is non-different from the effect. (Seirilkhya 
Karika, 9). In other words the effect is of the same nature as the cause (Radhakrishnan, 
1998a: 257) such that the relation between the cause and the effect must not be distinct. 
Barley plants derived from the seeds of barley are non different in their nature because 
the causal relation between them cannot subsist if they are essentially different from one 
another. Another example called upon to justify this argument is a piece of gold that can 
be made into earrings, bracelets, necklace so forth. While each of them are transformed 
into different shapes and designs, they all retain their original essence of the gold and 
that the gold is not changed into something totally new. (Koller, 2002: 57) In short, 
there is no effect which is non-identical to its cause or the causal relationship cannot be 
possible in two distinct natures. Therefore, on account of this relationship, the effect 
pre-exists in its cause. 
5. Critique of the Samkhya's Causal Arguments 
The Sarnkhya's causal arguments are no doubt very crucial for the school's justification 
of the existence of prakrti. Through the application of these causal arguments the 
Sanilchya claims the existence of prakrti and its participation in the process of the 
evolution. (Radhalcrishnan, 1998a: 256) It is the force ofprakrti which, according to the 
Sarnkhya school, drives the production of things. These arguments however are not 
received favourably by other sections of Indian thought. Among the critics of the 
arguments are alikara's Vedanta (Sharma, 1960: 252-57), Nyaya-Vaigesika (Shaw, 
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2005: 3-8), and the Buddhist Madhyamika. Given the limited scope of the project, my 
analysis will focus on the Madhyamika critique of the Sarplchya's arguments. 
Madhyamika philosophers such as Nagarjuna (100B.C.-100C.E.), Buddhapalita (ca. 
470-560), Bhavavevika (ca. 500-570) and Chandrakriti (ca. 570-650) unanimously 
refute the Samkhya's causal account as absolutely untenable. The Madhyamika critique 
of the Sarrikhya's causal account consists of two parts: The first part individually 
examines the validity of the arguments advanced by the Sanakhya, and refute them by 
pointing to the effect that the conclusion does not follow from any of the five 
arguments, and the second part collectively refutes the Sarrikhya's arguments without 
specifying the weaknesses in each individual argument. Let us turn to the first: 
Satiikhya's first causal argument states: The effect exists before the operation of 
cause because something cannot arise from nothing (Semikhya Karika, 9). From the 
Madhyamika point of view this argument does not work, it does not establish a causal 
relationship between what is to be proven and the proof presented. While this argument 
attempts to prove something must exist for it to bring forth the effect, it fails to show the 
pre-existence of the effect in the cause. The conclusion that is arrived at is totally 
irrelevant to the justifying reason provided. That is, while it is true that something 
cannot arise from nothing, therefore, the cause is required for the effect to eventuate, the 
Sarnkhya's conclusion (the existence of the effect before the causal operation) does not 
follow from this premise. It is absurd for the Sarnkhya to claim that if something must 
arise from something that this should necessarily imply the pre-existence of the effect. 
This has to follow because in proposing the pre-existence of effect in the cause, the 
Sarrikhya would have to rule out the need for the causal productivity, conversely, in 
proposing the need for causal productivity, the Samkhya would have to rule out the pre-
existence of effect in the cause. If the effect already exists, then it is pointless for it to 
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arise from the cause. This would follow because the cause is so-called for it functions to 
bring forth the effect, and the effect is so-called for it is that which emerges from the 
cause. Hence, the effect and the cause cannot be simultaneous. 
The second argument of Sarillchya reads: The effect exists before the operation of 
cause because any effect requires a material basis (uplidana). What this argument 
means in Radhakrishnan words, is: "The product is not different from the material of 
which it is composed."(1998a: 257) The Madhyamika challenges the Sarnkhya's claim 
of having an invariable relation between the material cause and the product. For this 
argument to work, the Sarnkhya would need to establish the causal correlation between 
the prakrti — the ultimate material cause of the world — and the world/evolute itself 
which is the effect of the prakrti wherein the former is, according to the Sarnkhya 
tradition, characterised as uncaused (ahetumat), permanent (nitya), nonspatial (vApin), 
pervasive, immobile (asakriya), singular (eka), unsupported (ands'rita), nonmergent 
(alinga), partless (anavayava), independent (aparatantra) (See Samkhya Karika, 9) and 
the latter is characterised as caused (hetumat), impermanent (anitya), spatial (avyiipin), 
non-pervasive, mobile (sakriya), multiple (aneka), supported (afrita), mergent (Miga), 
being made of parts (savayava), dependent (paratantra). In order to establish the causal 
connection between the two opposite entities — prakrti, the material cause and the 
world, the Sainkhya would be required to establish the existence of prakrti and its 
causal efficacy. If the Sarplchya fails to establish the existence of prakrti itself, 
establishing any causal connection (let alone invariable connection) — between the so-
called material cause of the world and the world which is its effect — would be 
impossible. On the Madhyamika's account, the Sarnkhya fails on both fronts: given the 
effects and the cause are mutually exclusive (as characterised above), the two are 
contradictory, thus cannot have any causal connection whatsoever. Therefore, either the 
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Samkhya's account of causation is to be rejected as untenable, or its theory ofprakrti as 
the first cause (the theory that motivates their account of causation) is to be rejected. 
The effect exists before the operation of cause because anything cannot just arise 
from just everything is the third causal argument of the SamIchya. I agree with the 
Sdrpkhya in ruling out the possibility of things coming into existence from everything 
including the causally unrelated entities - two distinct phenomena will have no causal 
sequence, like darkness cannot be the cause of the light, otherwise pitch darkness would 
generate brightness. Likewise, pebbles cannot be the cause of oil. That said, on the 
Madhyamika's reading, the argument suffers from the same problem as the others. 
While the premise itself is acceptable in isolation, what is not acceptable is the 
conclusion drawn from the premise. It only reveals the necessary relation between the 
cause and the effect but again does not prove the pre-existence of the effect in its cause. 
Therefore, the argument does not work. 
The effect exists before the operation of cause because something can only 
produce what it is capable of producing. The forth argument of Sarhkhya also makes no 
sense because it suffers from the same fallacy as the other arguments. While the 
Sarilkhya's premise makes sense as it explicitly postulates the specific causal capability 
required to produce the effect, the proof offered does not prove the thesis. First, even the 
non-exponents of the self-causation theory would never argue that potato seed for 
instance, will bring forth an unrelated entity like an apple. It is common knowledge that 
potatoes can only be obtained from the potato seed. However, the potato seed's 
capability of producing the potato as an effect does not prove the pre-existence of the 
effect in its cause. It proves, on the contrary, the potato seed's potency to produce potato 
effect that is yet to exist because the causal capability implies the potency to produce 
that which does not exist at that time. Second, since the Sarilkhya proposes the 
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simultaneous existence of the cause and the effect, the cause's 'capability of producing 
what it is capable of' makes no sense either. Because the causal potency, on the 
Sartikhya's account is redundant, as the effect already exists. Further, it does not 
function to produce any effect, let alone producing a particular effect. From the 
beginning, the cause is not assigned to any activity in the Sarhkhya tradition as the 
effect is believed to be already pre-existent. Surely, there is no need of causal potency to 
produce in such case. This also means the cause and the effect are independent from 
each other, hence the claim of requiring the specific cause for producing the specific 
effect falls apart. 
The fifth argument states: The effect exists before the operation of cause because 
the very nature or essence of the cause is non-different from the effect. This argument 
again is invalid and untenable. Like arguments discussed earlier, the proof used fails to 
prove the thesis. The thesis to be proven is the pre-existence of the effect in the cause, 
the proof used is the necessity of the identical relationship between the cause and the 
effect. In other words, the fact that the cause is non-different from the effect does not 
imply that the effect exists prior to its cause. The Sartikhya's claim for the existence of 
the effect in its cause prior to its production actually undermines the existence of the 
cause itself and its function. The fire is the effect which is produced from the fuel. If we 
take the Sarnkhya's claim seriously, then fire would exist in the fuel. This would follow 
on three counts. First, given the effect is the pre-existent in the cause, the fire has to 
exist in the fuel because fire is the effect of the fuel. Second, given the non-different 
relation — the identity of the cause and the effect — it would follow that the fire and the 
fuel would be identical because the former is the effect of the latter. Third, given the 
identical relation between the cause and the effect, and given the effect is pre-existent in 
its cause, it would follow that the fire and the fuel would be simultaneous — this would 
Page 24 of 124 
mean where and whenever there is fuel, there the fire exists. From this, it would follow 
that according to the Sathichya system, the fire would have destroyed its cause viz., fuel 
into the ashes before the fire is generated as the effect. 
6. Collective Refutation 
The chief exponents of the Madhyamika philosophy Nagarjuna, Buddhapalita and 
Chandralcriti refute the Sarialchya's doctrine of self-causation as follows: That the 
reproduction of the effect from the cause becomes pointless if the effect pre-exists in its 
cause since the effect would have already achieved its status. This must follow because 
production means attaining one's own status which is yet to be achieved. And when 
one's own status has already been achieved, there is no sense in producing it all over 
again. Hence, the repeated production of the effect is redundant. For this the Sathkhya 
might respond asserting that the production, in their view, only refers to the explicit 
manifestation of the effect from the unmanifest effect that exist in the cause, and 
therefore the production is not redundant. 
The Sarhkhya's reply however does not rebut the Madhyamika's refutation 
because it commits the fallacy of the infinite regress. This follows because the 
Sarahya's so-called manifest effect, given the pre-existence of the effect in its cause, 
which implies the simultaneous existence of the cause and the effect, would have in 
itself contained a cause with an unmanifest effect which needs further arising. Once the 
so-called unmanifest effect becomes a fully manifest effect, again, the latter, in spite of 
the fact it being fully manifest effect would require further manifestation because in it is 
again contained a cause that would produce further effect. Stating it differently, on the 
Sarbkhya's causal account, for every cause there has to be an effect and for every effect 
there has to be a cause. It follows therefore, there would be an uninterrupted endless 
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production from the cause containing in itself an unmanifest effect to a manifest state 
which always contain a cause. If the Sathkhya refuse to accept the further production 
from the cause which simultaneously exist in the effect then they would have to 
relinquish their central thesis — namely, the production of the manifest effect from the 
unmanifest effect which pre-exists in the cause. 
For the argument sake, grant that the Sanakhya's account of the production of 
unmanifest effect into manifest effect is a sound proposition. But the question still arises 
with respect to the relationship between the unmanifest cause and the manifest effect. 
The Madhyamika asks: Are the two distinct from each other or identical? If the 
Sarnkhya respond "yes" to the first, and claims for an identical relation between the 
cause and the manifest effect, then the aforesaid absurd consequences of senseless 
production and infinite regress would ensue. Furthermore, upholding such a notion is 
also problematic on the ground that "there would be no difference between the seed as 
generative cause and the sprout as effect, in terms of their shape, colour, flavour, 
efficacy or ripening." (Chandrakriti, 1989: 158). If the Sarnkhya responds "yes" to the 
second alternative, and claim that the relation between the cause and the manifest effect 
is distinct — then they would have to abandon their primary thesis — the theory of self-
causation. If the Sarnkhya accept this conclusion, then, on the Sarnkhya's causal 
account, the prakrti and its evolutes would become entirely distinct entities, and the two 
would have no causal connection whatsoever. This would entail that the evolutes — 
worldly phenomenon — have no cause. This means that the Sainkhya would have to 
reject one of its central theses — the prakrti is the primordial material cause of the 
evolutes. Therefore, the Sarnkhya would have to relinquish their own causal account 
viz., the self-causation theory because such theory would not be logically sustainable. 
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7. Conclusion 
So what can we say about the theory of self-causation and the Sariikhya's arguments 
defending their theory? As we have seen from the discussion presented above the 
Sartilchya's theory of self-causation is premised upon two related theses — the existence 
of the cause prior to the effect, and the existence of the prakrti which is inferred from 
the former thesis. The two are not self-evident theses, the plausibility of each needs to 
be argued and defended logically. If the Sartikhya proponents fail to provide a coherent 
argument for either of the two thesis, it would mean that the theory of self-causation is 
unsustainable. So the question is, does the Sartikhya succeed in providing the adequate 
argument in the defence of the two theses? The answer, in my view, is a categorical 
"no." All the five arguments presented to justify self-causation suffer from the 
circularity problem. Each argument employs a premise — the existence of the prakrti — 
which in turn needs to be proven. Since the existence of the prakrti remains to be 
proven, what remains to be proven surely cannot prove the existence of the effect in the 
cause. If the existence of the prakrti itself is not established, surely the prakrti cannot be 
used as the means, as the SathIchya does, to justify the existence of the primordial 
materially of prakrti. Like the prakrti the effect is yet to be proven. What itself requires 
proof cannot proof the existence of the prakrti. The Sari*Ilya's causal arguments are 
plagued by this problem throughout. Consequently, as shown earlier, the Sarifichya's 
causal thesis — the existence of the effect prior to the production of the cause — does not 
follow from the premises provided. 
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Having addressed the problems in the first of the four essentialist causal theories, 
in the next chapter I will turn my attention to the second essentialist causal theory — 
arising from another — and its critique of the Prasangika. 
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Chapter 2 
Theory of Arising from Another 
1. Introduction 
Chapter two examines the second alternative theory of causation, namely arising from 
another. The term "another" or "other" (parata) refers to the production of effect from 
cause other than itself, specifically, arising of effect from other essentially existent 
cause. Etymologically, the Sanskrit term parata (Tib. gzhan) refers to "other" while 
utpacla (Tib. skyes) means "to bring forth," "to produce," "to give rise to." Therefore the 
compound Sanskrit term parata utpacla (Tib. gzhan skyes) literally comes to mean 
"causation from the other." The causal theory formulated based on this view is 
therefore, variously known as the theory of "arising from another," (Samten and 
Garfield, 2006: 67) "external causation," (Kalupahana, 1991: 107) "production from 
another," (Huntington and Wangchen, 1989: 158). The term "another" or "other" 
(parata) in this context refers to the production of effect from cause other than itself, or 
arising of effect from other essentially existent cause. 
In this chapter I will examine the arguments for and against the theory of arising 
from another. I will first look at the exponents of the theory, discuss the assumptions 
and the arguments corroborating the theory; and then examine the theory critically by 
way of presenting the Madhyamika critique of the theory. 
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2. Exponents of the Theory 
The Buddhist essentialists unanimously reject the theory of self causation as an 
untenable causal thesis. They also reject the theory of arising from both self and another 
(Chapter 3) since this alternative is not sustainable unless the first two accounts — the 
theory of arising from self and the theory of arising from another — are upheld as 
plausible alternatives of causation. The theory of arising without cause (to be discussed 
in Chapter 4) is also rejected on both philosophical and empirical grounds. Therefore 
the only viable causal account is, so they claim, the theory arising from another. Unlike 
the Sarrikhya's theory of arising from self, the theory of arising from another appeals to 
the Buddhist and non-Buddhist philosophers alike. Excluding Sarrikhya, Jaina and 
Carvaka, the other orthodox schools of Vedic thought particularly Nyaya-Vaigesika, and 
Mimarhsa-Vedanta are advocates of this causal theory (Huntington and Wangchen, 
1989: 228). And amongst the Indian Buddhist schools, the essentialists — Sautantrikas, 
Vaibhasikas, and Yogacaras — and the Svatantrika Madhyamikas are said to be the 
exponents of this causal theory. (Gorampa, 2002: 255) Although there is a major 
difference between the way in which the Svatantrika Madhyamika advances the theory 
and the way in which the other Buddhist schools present theirs', the key difference is 
this: For the Buddhist essentialists, arising from another is the ultimate way in which 
things come to be, whereas for the Svatantrika Madhyamika things' arising from 
another is only on the conventional level. Hence the latter is not considered as an 
essentialist (Gorampa, 2002: 255, Ibid, 2001: 98; Tsongkhapa, 2006: 68). 
But what is "essence"? The Sanskrit term svabhava (Tib. rang bzhin) variously 
translates into English as "essence" (Garfield, 1995: 220) "intrinsic being" or "intrinsic 
nature" (Huntington, 1989: 48), "inherent existence" (Hopkins, 392, 438), and 
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ordinarily means real or ultimate nature or ultimate being of things or persons. Hence 
for the essentialists svabhava is the most important quality that makes things what they 
really are and it is svabhava that makes things causally effective. Without svabhava, the 
essentialist claim, things would be causally inefficient, thus functionally deficient. So 
svabhava accounts for causality of things for the essentialists. (I will offer more 
discussion on svabhava in Chapter 4) 
3. Causal Arguments Supporting the Theory 
I will start with considering the arguments advanced in defence of the theory. The 
Buddhist essentialists traditionally justify this causal thesis of arising from another by 
way of appealing to some specific scriptural citations and advancing the following 
arguments: 
• First, according to the Abhidharmikas things do arise from another because they 
arise from the inherently existing four conditions namely, (1) "efficient conditions" 
(Samten and Garfield, 2006: 72) or "primary condition" (Kalupahana, 1991: 106) (Skt. 
hetu pratyaya, Tib. rgu rken); (2) "objective condition" (Samten and Garfield, 2006: 72) 
or "objectively supporting condition" (Kalupahana, 1991: 106) (Skt. alambana 
pratyaya, Tib. dmigs rken); (3) "immediate condition" (Samten and Garfield, 2006: 72) 
or "immediately contiguous condition" (Kalupahana, 1991: 106) (Skt. samanantara 
pratyaya, Tib. de ma thak rkyen); and (4) "dominant condition" (Samten and Garfield, 
2006: 72, Kalupahana, 1991: 106) (Skt. adhipatyya, Tib. bdag rken). The four 
conditions are other than things that they produce since each of these four conditions are 
said to have their own svabhava (Tib. rang bzhin) "own nature," or "own essence" 
"inherent existence" in that they are declared by the Buddha himself as existing 
inherently. Since the satras are the authoritative words of the Buddha himself in that 
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they are regarded as the seminal texts for all the Buddhist schools, and given that things 
arise from the four conditions that are "other" than the things themselves, the 
Abhidharmikas insists the theory of arising from another is plausible. (Candrakirti, 
2003: 56, Rendawa, 1997: 112) 
• Second, the arising from another is plausible on the ground that things arise from 
the four elements that are other than things themselves. Like the four conditions the four 
great elements are called elements (dhatu) in that they bear their own intrinsic natures 
(attano sabhavain dharenti), having essences of their own. These four elements - earth, 
water, fire and air - support all the coexisting material phenomena for their existence. 
The earth element has the characteristic of "hardness" and it functions as a "foundation 
for the co-existing material phenomena and manifestation as receiving. Its approximate 
cause is the other three great essentials." (Bodhi, 2000: 238, Dorjee, 1996: 9-10 4) The 
water element or fluidity is characterized as "trickling or oozing, its function is to 
intensify the coexisting material states, and it is manifested as the holding together or 
cohesion of material phenomena. Its approximate cause is the other three great 
essentials." (Bodhi, 2000: 238, Dorjee, 1996: 11 5) The fire element has the 
characteristic of "heat and its function is to mature or ripen other material phenomena, 
and it is manifested as a continuous supply of softness. Its approximate cause is the 
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other three great essentials." (Bodhi, 2000: 238, Dorjee, 1996: 126) The air element has 
the characteristic of "distension, its function is to cause motion in the other material 
phenomena, and it is manifested as conveyance to other places. Its approximate cause is 
the other three great essentials." (Bodhi, 2000: 238, Dorjee, 1996: 14 7) So these four 
elements, for the Abhidharmikas, serve as the causal foundation for the formation of the 
shape and the color of the material world. It is obvious that the existence of the material 
phenomena is entirely dependent on these elements. The Abhidharmikas hold that each 
element conditions the remaining elements and their secondary derivatives. While the 
true identity of each element is not conditioned or caused by any other phenomena since 
each element intrinsically possesses its own identity. They insist that the identities of 
other phenomena such as table, chairs etc are entirely dependent upon the elements. 
Thus arising from another still makes sense. (Dorjee, 1996: 5) 
• Third, the Abhidharmikas, in particular, Vaibhasikas and Sautrantikas argue that 
things do arise from another because they are produced either by the indivisible atom or 
the infinitesmal consciousness both of which are other than things themselves. 
(Vasubandhu, 1997: 523) The Abhidharmikas assert the intrinsic existence of the 
indivisible matter and consciousness for the reason that the infinitesimal unit of matter 
and the infinitesimal mind are, according to them, the "ultimate truths that can bear 
analysis." (Hopkins, 1996: 338) Whereas the seed for example is a conventional truth 
because it has contained in it the indivisible material unit as its foundation. Given the 
intrinsic existence (svabhava / rang bzhin) of the indivisible material, and given that it 
6 
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serves as the foundation for the arising of other phenomena, so the Abhidharmikas 
argue, the arising from another is logically justified. Similarly, given the intrinsic 
existence of the indivisible consciousness, and given that it is the foundational structure 
of the mind, it follows, on this view, the momentary life of consciousnesses is caused by 
something other than itself, namely, the indivisible and inherently existent unit of 
consciousness. 
• Fourth, among the Abhidharmikas, Vaibhasika argues for the arising from 
another on the ground of the simultaneous existence of the cause and effect. (Lchang 
skya, 1989: 66, Hopkins, 1996: 339) This view can best be understood by appealing to 
this example — the way in which the eyes see objects. According to this view, it is the 
visual organ itself that sees the object immediately without any image. So this view 
rejects the classical Buddhist position in which visual consciousness is viewed as the 
one that apprehends the objects. If it is the visual consciousness that sees object, the 
Vaibhasikas argue, there would be no reason why we could not see the objects sitting 
behind walls. Because the visual consciousness is maintained as formless and 
immaterial, unlike the visual faculty which is material in its nature, there is no reason 
why the visual consciousness sees through walls to the object sitting behind. Therefore, 
according to the exponent of this view, it is the eye faculty itself, and not visual 
consciousness, that sees things. Since seeing as the effect is other than the eye itself 
which causes the act of seeing, according to this view, the cause and the effect are 
different, thus the effect arises from the cause other than itself. And moreover because 
both the eye and the act of seeing can exist at the same time, they are simultaneous. 
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• Fifth, according to the Svatantrika Madhyamika things do arise from another on 
the conventional level 8 because cause and effect are not identical conventionally, 
therefore they must be distinct. Since it is a conventionally distinct cause that gives rise 
to a conventionally distinct effect, the school concludes, things must arise from another. 
Therefore the arising from another do exist, even though merely conventionally. 
However the Svatantrika Madhyamika rejects the four problematic causal accounts on 
the ultimate level. The school argues, take a sprout for an example, it does not 
ultimately arise either from self or another, or both or neither. The school's rejection of 
all four alternative causations only ultimately seems to suggest the school's inadvertent 
approval, at least conventionally, of all the four causations. This also leads some 9 to 
suggest, on the conventional level, the Svatantrika Madhyamika advocates the arising 
from self, both and causeless for the reason that the school only reject these causal 
accounts ultimately. But this is a unreasonable proposition, for the Svatantrika 
Madhyamika explicitly rejects the arising from self, both, and causelessly. 
• The sixth argument comes from Abhidharmika's which appeals to commonsense 
realism or the view of ordinary beings in terms the way in which they see the 
relationship between parents and childem. According to the advocates of the theory, the 
parents see themselves (the producer) as other than their children (the produced), so do 
children see themselves distinct from their parents. (Garfield, 1995: 106). These 
perceptions clearly show that cause and effect are indeed accepted conventionally as 
different, therefore the arising from another is established. 
8 All the Abhidharmilca's arguments presented above are advanced with intention to justify the arsing 
from another as the ultimate way how things really are, although it should be noted that they do not 
explicitly use this type of language. the Svatantrika Madhyamika, on the other hand does make explicit 
distinction between the arising from another ultimately and conventionally, and that it only endorses the 
arising from another conventionally. 
9 Prof. Tashi Tsering for example, during a personal interview - (Jan 2007) suggested that the Svatantrika 
Madhyamikas use of the qualifying word "ultimate" to reject the four alternative causations raises some 
philosophical problems with the school. One is that the school might be forced to accept, on the 
conventional level, all the four causal theories, not just the arising from another. 
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These are some of the major arguments advanced by the Buddhist exponents of 
the theory of arising from another. These arguments however are not received 
favourably by the Prasatigika Madhyamika school. So from hereon, I will discuss the 
Prasatigika Madhyamika's rejection of these arguments 
4. Critique of the Causal Arguments 
The Prasatigika Madhyamika provides detail objections against the notion of inherent 
production of phenomena, even at the conventional level. I will first consider the 
Prasatigika's general critique of this causal theory and then return to more specific 
critique of the arguments advanced in support of the theory of arising from another. 
Generally speaking, according to the Prasangika Madhyamika school, the theory of 
arising from another is underpinned by a commitment to the essentialist view of 
causation. Nagarjuna says: 
"The difference of cause and effect is never tenable." 1° (MMK: 20: 18cd) 
"If they were different then the cause and non-cause would be alike." 
(MMK: 20: 19cd) 
In these two lines Nagarjuna rejects the tenability of the cause and the effect being 
essentially different on the ground that this would imply the inherent difference of the 
cause and its effect. This makes sense given that no causal relation would exist between 
what is essentially existent cause and essentially existent effect since they would be 
independent from each other. If however someone insists that what is essentially 
existent cause and essentially existent effect are still causally related, this would be 
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tantamount to claiming that a cause and a non-cause are identical since the relation 
between what is essentially existent cause and essentially existent effect would be 
identical to the relation between cause and noncause. Furthermore, the arising of the 
effect from the cause would not be possible since the causal efficacy necessary to 
produce the effect would not exist. Following Nagarjuna's philosophical lead closely 
Candrakirti offers a systematic critique of the theory mostly by means of using reductio 
ad absurdum in his Madhyamakavatara: First he says, if an entity arises in dependence 
on (what is essentially) another, then pitch darkness would arise from a flame. 
(Candrakirti, 1999: 90) Here the term "arises in dependence on another" — indicates the 
production of an inherent sprout from an inherent seed — it implies the production of an 
independently existent effect from an independently existent cause. For the Buddhist 
essentialists, since an inherently existent rice seed produces an inherently existent rice 
sprout, there is no reason why, on this view, that light cannot give rise to pitch darkness. 
The essentially existent rice seed giving rise to essentially existent rice sprout is no 
different from the essentially existent light giving rise to pitch darkness. If the former 
conclusion is acceptable for the Buddhist essentialist, so should the latter since both 
theses are premised upon inherent production, and therefore, inherently existent cause 
and effect. 
Candrakirti's second reductio follows from the previous one: If things arise from 
another, then, according to the theory of arising from other: anything could arise from 
anything, because it is not simply the cause which is different from its effect — all non-
causes as well are different from the effect. (Candrakirti, 1999: 91) This reductio 
follows because, like the production of the rice sprout from the rice seed, the barley 
seed not only should give rise to its effect i.e., barley sprout, but also would produce 
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rice sprout since the barley seed is not only different from its sprout but all the non 
causes such as the rice sprout as well are different from the barley seed. 
Both Candrakirti's reductios refute the theory of arising from another proposed by 
the essentialist but the difference between the two reductio is this. The former explicitly 
projects the absurdity of production of the effect from inconsistent causal conditions 
implying that things must arise from appropriate conditions. The later reductio 
demonstrates the absurdity of production of the effect without achieving all the 
necessary conditions implying that the production of things depend upon the 
appropriation of all necessary and sufficient conditions. 
The proponents of the theory of arising from another insist that Candrakirti's 
charges are not founded. Fallacies of absurd consequences such as light giving rise to 
pitch darkness, and anything coming out of anything are, according to them, not 
committed by advocating the theory of arising from another. They offer the following 
rebuttal arguments: (MA 1999: 92) 
• cause is only capable of producing its specific effect, so the error of anything 
giving rise to anything (or everything) does not ensue; 
• there exists a homogeneous continuity between the cause and its effect as in the 
case of a barely seed and its sprout (in contrast with a barley seed and sun flower), so 
the problem of the cause giving rise to the effect which has a distinct continuum does 
not arise just as barley seed does not give rise to sun flower; 
• there exists a sequential causal relationship between the last event of cause and 
the first event of effect, which means there is a causal relationship that exists between 
the second moment of cause and the first moment of effect. This relationship is not 
possible in unrelated things. This therefore prevents things coming out of unrelated 
entity. 
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From the Madhyamika point of view, the essentialist attempt to rebut the 
Madhyamika charges against their causal accounts still do not work. Given the fact that 
the essentialist are committed to the essentialist account of difference, the difference at 
issue between the rice seed and the rice sprout would be identical to the difference 
between the barley seed and the rice sprout. The barley seed would not produce the rice 
sprout because: (1) it does not have the capability to produce rice; (2) they lack the same 
causal continuum; and (3) they lack causal similarity. In the same way, given that the 
rice sprout, on the essentialist account, is inherently different from the rice seed, it 
would thus follow, the rice seed would not be able to produce the rice sprout — there 
would be no causal relation between the rice seed and the rice sprout whatsoever. 
(Candrakirti, 1999: 93) Huntington and Wangchen explains: "The flower seeds are by 
definition different from the rice sprout simply because they do not possess its 
characteristic qualities; and if the grain of rice is designated as 'other' than the rice 
sprout, then it must be so designated for the same reason." (1989: 229) 
So the essentialist rebuttals do not undermine the Madhyamika refutation of their 
causal account, instead the rebuttals undermine their own essentialist causal account that 
they are attempting to establish. Three arguments presented to rebut the charges fail to 
establish the essential causal relation between cause and effect, therefore failing to 
advance the theory of arising from another. Instead these same arguments demonstrate 
the opposite — the inter-relatedness of cause and effect, thus emptiness of essential 
causal power. So the essentialist's rebuttals unwittingly advance the Madhyamika's 
position by undermining its own position. 
The Prasatigika Madhyamika points out another problem with the theory of 
arising from another / other. The theory is based on the claim that cause is other than its 
effect. From the Prasarigika Madhyamika standpoint, this causal thesis is not justified. It 
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is in fact a contradictory causal thesis. If seed and sprout are other, then seed and its 
sprout must be perceived as existing simultaneously as two distinct entities. But this 
indeed does not make sense — when the seed is perceived, the sprout is not perceived as 
other. When the sprout is perceived, the seed is not perceived as other. In other words, 
the sprout is not other with reference to seed since the sprout does not exist 
simultaneously with the seed, thus there is no otherness. Even if the seed and its sprout, 
hypothetically speaking, are perceived as existing simultaneously there would be no 
causal relation between the two since the seed would be other than its sprout like that of 
chalk and cheese. 
In a nutshell: when there is arising from the cause and its effect, there is no 
otherness between them. When there is otherness between the cause and its effect, there 
is no production of the effect. If there is no otherness between the cause and the effect, 
they cannot be simultaneous either given that the former and the latter are causally inter-
related. Since the cause and its effect are not simultaneous the claim that the seed and its 
effect are other, different or another makes no sense. So if the another in the theory of 
arising from another is not defensible surely it is not possible to establish the arising in 
the arising from another. 
5. Refuting the Causal Simultaneity 
The essentialist still insists that arising from another is feasible on the ground that the 
seed and the sprout are simultaneous. The essentialist in fact makes this point by 
appealing to the kdistamba Sutra (the sutra on a stalk of rice) where the analogy of 
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scale is used to explain the objective or external dependent origination I2 (Skt. bahyaly 
pratilyasamutpada, Tib. phyi'i rten 'bre°. The Sutra reads: 
How is it (to be seen) as 'not annihilation'? Not from the previous 
cessation of the seed does the sprout issue forth, nor indeed without the 
cessation of the seed. But still the seed ceases, and at just that time the 
sprout arises, like the beam of a scale rocking to and fro. Therefore 
annihilation is not (the case), I3 (Reat, 1998:41) 
It is true that in the sutra the analogy of the two ends of the scale are used to explain 
the causal relation between the seed and the sprout. While analysing the causal relation 
between the seed and the sprout, Nagarjuna maintains that it is neither through the 
cessation of the seed nor without the termination of the seed is it possible to give rise to 
the sprout. This is for the reason that there would be no causal nexus or power to bring 
forth the sprout in either case. However, Nagarjuna maintains when the seed ceases at 
the same time the sprout also emerges like that of descending and ascending of the 
scale. (2004: 172) Nagarjuana also gives this gloss on the S'alistambastitra: 
Neither does the sprout posited like seed. 
Nor does it arise without cause. 
Cessation [of the seed] and arising [of the sprout] are simultaneous 
Like the ascending and descending process of the two ends of the scale. 
(21)(Nagarjuna, 2004: 81)' 
12  Dependent Origination is categorised into the internal/subjective dependent origination and the 
external/objective dependent origination. Subjective dependent origination explains the causal process of 
the wheel of life and the objective dependent origination offers the causal account of the external 
phenomena. 
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On this point, the Tibetan Prasangika Madhyamikas such as Red mda' ba (1995: 116), 
Tsongkhapa (2004: 206-207) and Karmapa Mi bskyod rdo rjes (n.d.: 270) closely 
follow Candrakirti's position and maintain that the analogy "neither suggest the arising 
from another nor does is suggest the arising by virtue of self-defining characteristics 
(svalalcsarja / rang mtshan). The analogy instead illustrates the simultaneously 
interdependent arising, verified by non-analytical (cognition) and is taken to be illusion-
like".(1999: 98) 15 The meaning imbedded in the phrase simultaneously interdependent 
arising (Tib. cig car du brten nas `byung ba) has a special significance in understanding 
the issue at stake here. On this point, while most of the commentators are silent, 
Tsonglchapa provides us a useful insight to understand Candrakirti's phrase. According 
to Tsongkhapa, the term simultaneously interdependent arising must refer to the "two 
co-existing processes" — ceasing of the seed and arising of the sprout.(2004: 207) 16 He 
offers the following arguments in his commentary to Candralcirti's Madhyamakiivatara 
(2004: 207): 
• The ascending and descending ends of the scale as depicted in the siitra does 
indeed illustrate that Nagarjuna is definitely showing that arising is simultaneously 
interdependent. But the simultaneous at issue here must not be interpreted as the one 
between the seed and its sprout, rather simultaneous should be understood between the 
process of the ceasing of the seed and the process of the arising of its sprout. 
• That the simultaneity of two processes is justified on the Prasatigika 
Madhyamika account. For it rejects the essentialist account of the two processes 
established by virtue of the self-defining characteristics (svalaksana / rang mtshan). 
15 	
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Moreover, so long as one maintains the arising, one also needs to accept the 
simultaneous co-existence of the cessation of the seed and the arising of its sprout. This 
position is tenable on the Madhyamika account since it is committed to mere arising 
from mutually interdependent factors that utterly rejects arising by virtue of inherent 
causal power such through svalakscaja. 
• For the Ma-dhyamika school, the ceasing of the seed and the arising of the sprout 
are temporally simultaneous and co-extensive. This however is not the case with the 
essentialist. For the latter, simultaneous existence of the two processes would 
necessarily mean the simultaneous existence of the seed and its sprout for the reason 
that the essentialist is committed to the essential existence of both the seed and its 
sprout. (I will return to this point later) 
• The process of arising of the sprout as an action and the sprout itself as an agent 
are mutually interdependent. But this mutual interdependence between the process of 
arising of the sprout and the sprout itself is also not an intrinsic one. Thus this mutual 
relation between the two does not need to withstand the test of ultimate analysis. 
Moreover, if the mutual interdependence between the process of arising of the sprout 
and the sprout itself is an intrinsic, in that case no change whatsoever will be possible. 
The process of arising would always infinitely be dependent on the sprout, so would the 
sprout be infinitely dependent on the arising. This dependence would go on forever thus 
making the arising of sprout impossible. In contrast, for mere arising of the Prasatigika 
Madhyamika school, although the arising and the sprout are mutually interdependent 
they do not need to be mutually dependent forever, for the reason that this mutual 
dependence is not intrinsically established. Thus it is possible for the process of arising 
to come to an end thus giving rise to a fully mature sprout. 
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6. Refuting the Application of the Scale-Analogy 
According to the Madhyamika school, the simultaneity of the two processes of the scale 
does not demonstrate simultaneity of the seed and its sprout as the essentialist wants to 
interpret it. It is quite obvious that the ascent and descent of the two ends of the scale is 
apprehended simultaneously but this does not apply to the seed and its sprout. The seed 
which is in the process of cessation is about to cease but not just yet ceased, thus it exist 
only in the present. The sprout which is in the process of arising is about to arise but not 
just yet arisen, thus it will exist only in the future. Whereas the two ends of the scale 
both exist in the present. (Candrakirti, 1999: 97) Therefore the example of the scale 
does not show the simultaneous existence of the seed and its sprout. 
Furthermore for the essentialist, the Madhyamika school argues, the analogy 
would also fail to show the simultaneity of the two processes. This is on two counts: 
First, since the sprout only exists in the future, it does not exist yet. This would mean 
that, for the essentialist, there is no basis for the process of arising to occur in the 
present. So it makes no sense to claim that that the two processes or two actions are 
simultaneous given that the action of arising of the sprout would not exist 
simultaneously with the action of ceasing of the seed. Hence, the simultaneity of the two 
processes and the two ends of the scale are not analogous. Second, since on the 
essentialist account all phenomena including the two processes exist essentially, the 
processes of ceasing of the seed and the arising of the sprout either have to (1) exist 
intrinsically identical to their agents — seed and sprout — or (2) independent of the two 
agents. If it is (1) then it follows the two processes and the two agents would have to 
exist simultaneously. And this has been rejected on the ground that there won't be any 
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causal relation whatsoever between the processes and the agents. If it is (2) then the 
absurd consequence of action without agent would ensue. In other words, there would 
be a process of arising and ceasing without the existence of the seed and its sprout. 
It is thus evident that, on the essentialist account, even the simultaneity of the two 
processes leads to absurd consequences. For the Prasatigika Madhyamika however, 
Tsonglchapa argues, there is no such problem — the proposal of the simultaneity of the 
two processes would not lead to the absurd consequences. There are two primary related 
reasons for this: First that the Prasangika rejects the inherent existence of the seed and 
its sprout and the two processes. Second that it is committed to mutual interdependence 
of the seed and its sprout and the two processes. So because the two ends of scale exist 
in the present, and because the processes of descending and the ascending of the scale 
are dependent upon them, two processes can be said to occur simultaneously. In this 
sense the example of the scale is applied to demonstrate the co-presence of the two 
processes - the process of arising of the sprout and the process of ceasing of the seed. 
However, the example does not demonstrate the simultaneous existence of the seed and 
its sprout on the ground that the seed and its sprout are not co-present like that of the 
two ends of the scale. 
• But why does the Prasatigika Madhyamaka not commit the same error as the 
essentialist? According to Tsongkhapa though the seed itself and two processes — the 
ceasing of the seed and the arising of the sprout — are temporally simultaneous since 
they occur at the same time, but the existence of sprout is not simultaneous to them. 
Since the sprout is in the process of becoming, but not yet is. Tsongkhapa argues that 
for the Prasarigika, this is not a problem — the problem of the action without the agent 
would not occur. Stating the point differently, although the sprout does not exist in the 
present, the arising of the sprout in the present is still tenable. The fact that the sprout 
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does not exist in the present does not necessarily mean that there is no arising process of 
the sprout in the present. The process of the arising of the sprout is itself the becoming 
of the sprout in the future and the becoming of the sprout in the present makes the future 
existence of the sprout possible. This is because of their mutual interdependence that 
lacks any intrinsic existence whatsoever. 
Tsonglchapa offers another argument why on the Prasangika account the arising of 
the sprout in the present is still tenable although the sprout itself does not exist in the 
present. Tsongkhapa explains although it is the case that the seed ceases to exist during 
the sprout, it is not the case that sprout also ceases to exist as a result. This is because, as 
a general principle, when the object to which something depends ceases, the dependent 
also ceases given the seed is the object to which the sprout depends and the sprout is the 
dependent. (2004: 208) 17 This makes sense. Let me illustrate this point with an example. 
When we switch off a heater, the warmth in the room does not disappear immediately. 
Although the efficient cause is not there nevertheless the effect i.e., the warmth still 
lingers. This is because of the interdependence between the switching on the heater as 
the cause and the heat it generated as effect including the environment of the whole 
room such as the closure of the doors and windows as wel1. 18 Similarly, during the 
process of arising of the sprout, the sprout does not exist, but the seed and its process of 
ceasing and other favourable conditions (four elements, fertility of the soil, capability in 
the seed to produce the sprout, etc) helping in the cessation of the seed and production 
of the sprout do exist. Hence Tsongkhapa argues: "As long as one accepts arising, one 
also needs to accept the simultaneous existence of the cessation of the cause and the 
17 
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18 In my personal interview with Prof. Yeshi Thapkhey, he illustrates the context with the example of the 
fire and smoke. Even when the wood has run out and the fire ceases to exist we can still find the existence 
of smoke in the air afterward. This he says is possible because of the interdependence of the smoke and 
fire. 
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eventual emergence of the effect;" and "that this would not be irrational for those who 
accept mere arising or conventional arising."(Samten and Garfield, 2006: 75) 
In his magnum opus, Ocean of Reasoning, Tsongkhapa writes: "the arising of 
things which are simultaneous - the arising of the effect depends on the activities of 
arising and ceasing occurring at the same time - and dependently arisen can be taken to 
exist so long as it is not analysed." (2006: 77) The phrase "dependently arisen can be 
taken to exist so long as it is not analysed" implies that the mutual dependence and 
simultaneity of the two processes is tenable only in the conventional sense and strictly 
not in the ultimate sense. If it is the latter then the mutual dependence and simultaneity 
of the two processes would be an intrinsic and ultimate, such that it would have to 
withstand the test of logical scrutiny. If this is the case then the dependence and 
simultaneity would be also intrinsic such that it would make the emergence of the sprout 
from the seed impossible, given that the two would be always inseparable. 
In brief, Tsongkhapa interprets the analogy of the scale in the sutra as applicable 
only in context of the simultaneity of the two processes which are inherently empty of 
any essence and that they being mutually interdependent. In my view Tsong,khapa's 
explanation of the implication of the analogy makes good sense and it does fill the 
explanatory gap which Candrakirti and Nagarjuna did not explicitly address in their 
commentaries on the application of the analogy. Tsongkhapa's explanation also sheds 
light on the reason why the commitment to the essentialist interpretation of the 
implication of the scale-analogy would necessarily entail an absurd consequence. 
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7. Prasangika's Critique of the Specific Arguments 
Having presented the Prdsatigika's general critique of the theory of arising from 
another, we can now briefly consider the Prasangika's specific critiques of the 
essentialist arguments (section 1) advanced in the support of the arising from another. 
This is important for it will clarify the Prasangika's specific critiques of each of the 
arguments proposed in favour of the arising from another. From the Prasangika's point 
of view none of the arguments advanced by the Abhidharmikas for the purpose of 
demonstrating the arising from another ultimately and the Svatantrika Madhyamika 
arguments to justify the arising from another conventionally works. According to the 
Prasatigika the Abhidharmika's first argument is premised upon the assumption that the 
four conditions are essentially real having inherent svabhavas of their own, that these 
four conditions are responsibile for producing the effects and that this view is supported 
by the Buddha himself. If this premise is correct then causal conditions that lead to the 
arising of things and things themselves as effects should exist independently of each 
other implying that the existence of the effects should be perceivable as other than the 
conditions which produced them. If this is true than visual consciousness as an effect 
has to be perceived as other than the conditions such as visual faculty and the object, an 
appropriate distance, proper light etc. If this is the case the existence of visual 
consciousness would not be dependent upon the above conditions. But that would make 
no sense since the existence of visual consciousness is clearly dependent upon its 
conditions given that without its conditions the visual consciousness does not exist. If 
the Abhidharmikas maintain the visual consciousness as causally produced, dependently 
arisen at least in sofar as each condition comes into existence due to other factors. Then 
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it would make no logical sense to argue that things arise from conditions other than 
themselves. 
The second argument of the Abhidharmikas also commits a similar fallacy. On 
the one hand it tries to establish the otherness of the five elements and the things as their 
effects, on the other hand, it attempts to establish the causal link between the things 
produced by the five elements and the producer, the five elements themselves. From the 
Prasangika point of view these two tasks are mutually exclusive. If the former is to be 
achieved the latter must be abandoned given that the otherness must be founded on the 
distinct nature of the elements and things they produce. If the latter is to be acheived the 
former must be relinquished given that a causal relation must be founded on the 
mutually compatible relation between the elements and the things they produce. Both 
follow because being causally related and being intrinsically other are not compatible. 
Moreover if the characteristics of the five elements are intrinsic to themselves, and that 
they are other than the things they each produce, as the Abhidharmikas maintain, then 
the elements cannot be considered as the causal conditions of other material things. As 
is evident the material objects do possess similar characteristics as that of the elements: 
they are either liquid or solid or gas. If the elements are distinctly other than the things 
they each produce, there should be no reason that the characteristics of the elements are 
passed on to things that they supposedly produce. 
The Abhidharmikas third argument to prove the existence of the arising from 
another is no better than the previous two. According to the philosophy of- the 
Prasangika it is mutually contradictory to argue that there is intrinsically existent 
indivisible atoms and infinitesimal units of consciousness on the one hand and on the 
other hand to assert that these two indivisible entities are responsible for the arising of 
the matter and the mind. If atoms and infinitesimal consciousness are indivisible and 
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intrinsically existent, the Prasatigika contends, they both are causally impotent. Neither 
the atoms nor the infinitesimal consciousness would be able to accomodate changes and 
transformations necessary for the production of the matter and the mind given their 
intrinsic identities. If the Abhidharmika concedes that atoms and the infinitesimal 
consciousness do undergo changes and transformations, either they would have to 
accept that such changes are intrinsic to the nature of atoms and infinitisimal 
consciousness or such change occur due to the force of other influences. If it is the 
former again then atoms and consciousness would not be the cause of other things since 
such causation necessarily involves relinquishing the former identities to acquire other 
identities of things. If it is the latter, then atoms and consciousness would no longer be 
indivisible and intrinsically existents for at least certain part of atoms or consciousness 
would undergo change due to the influence of the other surrounding them. Hence the 
Abhidharmika's view that the indivisible and intrinsically existent atoms and 
consciousness are the causal agents of the world makes little sense. 
The fourth argument proposing the simultaneity of cause and effect is an 
interesting one. However, as I have shown in the earlier part of this chapter, for the 
Prasatigika Madhyamika, even this argument from the Abhidharmika does not work. 
This argument can also be refuted on the ground that if cause and effect were to be 
simultaneous, then the effect would be existent during the time of the cause. If the effect 
already exists during the causal stage, it is pointless for it to arise all over again, 
therefore it makes no sense for the effect to be causally produced. (Hopkins, 1996: 647) 
The fifth argument, unlike the previous Abhidharmika arguments, is from the 
Svatantrika Madhyamikas, at least according to the readings of Tsongkhapa and the 
like. The Svatantrikas claim that things arise from another conventionally but reject the 
idea that things arise from another ultimately. This view also does not recieve any 
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sympathy from the Prasatigikas. According to the latter the only way things could exist 
is conventionally and there is no other way of being. And if things' conventional 
existence is determined by being arisen from another — in that they are other than the 
causes that produce them — that would be their ultimate being, not just simply 
conventionally. In other words, if things did arise conventionally due to the force of the 
other, then that must be how things come into existence ultimately. This must follow for 
the Prasangikas because things cannot have two modes of arisings: coventional and the 
ultimate. All the Madhaymikas, including the Svatantrikas would deny that things have 
ultimate arising because to accept things as arising ultimately is identical to accept 
things arising inherently and independently. 
The Abhidharmika's sixth and the final argument which appeals to 
commonsense realism or the view of ordinary beings is also rejected by the Prasangika 
Madhyamikas. In Candrakirti's words: "It is known that in everyday life people say, 
'By sowing the seed, I gave rise to this son,' and '[by sowing the seed] they think, I 
have planted the tree.' Therefore arising from another is not even accepted in everyday 
life." (MA 6.32) What this means, according to the Prasangika, although parents might 
see themselves as causes of their children and children perceive themselves as produced 
by their parents and both parents and children might see themselves as distinct. But that 
does not necessarily explain the causal relation that is involved in the process. For the 
Prasatigika parents are not the cause of children but their reproductive cells,, the 
presence of a sentient aspect and other appropriate conditions are the causal conditions. 
Looking at causation in this way, children cannot be separated from the genes they 
inherited from their parents. So it is simply a delusion to think the cause and the effect 
as independent from each other. 
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8. Conclusion 
I have explicity demonstrated in this chapter that the theory of arising from another is 
totally untenable from the Prasangika Madhyamika perspective. Although the advocates 
of the theory of arising from another are mostly Buddhists, especially Abhidharmikas 
who appeal to commonsense realism, the arguments advanced in order to support the 
view fails the tests of logical scrutiny and also fundamentally fails to explain the 
relationship between the cause and the effect. The majority of problems catalogued in 
the chapter against the causal theory of arising from another hinges on the metaphysics 
of causality given that the Abhidharmikas arguments have in them the causal power of 
the other as the main thrust. They insist that things or entities come into existence due to 
the causal power of entities other than themselves. Even the Svdtantrika Madhyamikas, 
despite their denial of the ultimate arising from another, insist that things conventionally 
arise from another. The Prdsangika Madhyamika however, as I have demonstrated here, 
rejects this theory on both conventional and ultimate level. One central concern for the 
Prasangika is that so-called arising from another radically undermines the theory of 
dependent arising in that it deprives the interconnectedness of the causal process. This 
relation is, according to the Prasangika, at the heart of the causal explanation. 
In the next chapter I will turn my attention towards the third (theory of arising 
from both self and another) and the fourth alternative causal theories (theory of arising 
from causelessly) and examine the Prdsangika critiques of the causal accounts. This 
examination, along with the examinations in Chapter 1 and 2, should provide us with 
good conceptual framework for the delineation of the Prasangika Madhyamika's own 
causal thesis which will be the topic of discussion in Chapter 4 and 5. 
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Chapter 3 
Theory of Arising from Both and Causelessly 
1. Introduction 
In this Chapter I will discuss the problems associated with the third and the fourth 
alternative causal theories. I have several reasons for accommodating these causal 
theories within the fold of one chapter. First, the theory of arising from both and the 
theory of arising from causelessly are causal theories developed and advanced 
respectively by Jaina and Carvala / Lokayata. Both of these schools belong to the 
heterodox and non-vedic Indian schools of thought. Both reject the Vedic conception of 
the creation of the world by God. Second, philosophical discussions and materials 
pertaining to causation are quite limited in both traditions. Hence my discussion on 
theory of arising from both and causelessly is going to be brief. 
According to Madhyamaka texts, the exponents of the third alternative causal 
theory which claims arising from both self and another (Tib. gnyis skyes) is part of the 
Jaina tradition. (Candrakirti, 1999: 201) Essentially this theory explains the causal 
process by appealing to the combined causal characteristics of both self and another. 
Jainism argues that Sariikhya's justification of the theory of arising from the self where 
things are said to arise from a single potent cause and the Buddhist reificationists 
justification for the idea that things arise from causes other than themselves are both 
problematic and thus unacceptable. Therefore, Jainism proposes a causal view which 
combines the two causal theories together, thus arguing that things arise from both self 
and another. Consider for example a vase. Jainism argues that the existence of a vase is 
combination of two types of causes: one which is identical to the pot itself — the clay 
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from which the pot is made — and the others that are different from the pot or other than 
the pot itself — including the artistic hands of the potter, heat, water, air etc. The former 
equals arising from the self and the latter amounts to arising from another. The 
Prasangika reject this account as problematic on similar metaphysical grounds. They 
argue that Jaina's causal theory is untenable on the similar grounds as the two causal 
theories — the theory of arising from self and the theory of arising from another — taken 
separately to justify the causal process are untenable as I have shown in Chapter 1 and 
Chapter 2. The first part of Chapter 3 will consider Jaina's causal arguments which will 
be followed by the Prasanigika critique of Jaina's causal theory. 
The second part of this chapter will consider the Indian Materialist CArvaka / 
Lokayata's causal account, the fourth causal alternative — causation without cause. This 
will be followed by the Prasangika critique of the Carvalca's causal account. Carvalca / 
Lokayata argue that as long as things are maintained as arising from oneself, another 
and both, the position is bound to fail in its logical consistency. So Carvalka reject three 
other causal theses as problematic. Instead, they propose the causal thesis which claims 
that things are born without specific causal explanations such that neither are they born 
from themselves nor from others nor from both. Carvaka challenge the causal theorists 
saying that things come into existence without specific reasons or explanations. Peacock 
feathers are rich and colourful, and give aesthetic joy. And some bushes are simply 
pointed. Nobody is responsible for producing them thus there is no causal explanation 
needed. Peacocks and pointy bushes are what they are naturally by accident. 19 (Cited in 
Gorampa, 2002: 263) The Prasangika also reject this uncaused causal theory as I will 
show later in its critique of the Carvaka's causal account. 
19 
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2. Theory of Arising from Both 
2.1. Jaina Metaphysics / Causality 
The Jaina metaphysics is steeped in the doctrine known as Anekantavada — many sided 
or non-one-sided position. This doctrine is partly a result of Jainism's ethical response 
to the rise of various conflicting metaphysical thoughts in India where standpoints of 
one school clashed with other schools, where one view is asserted as the only right-
view, other's are condemned and rejected. The doctrine of Anekantavada partly reflects 
Jainism's perspective of the nature of reality. Jainism views reality as always multi-
dimensional possessing infinite characteristics of which many often appear to be 
contradictory and beyond the perceptual range of ordinary beings. Each individual 
thinks differently about the same reality. While each perception is partially correct it is 
also a skewed way of seeing things. Viewed from a broader spectrum, one view 
contradicts another's perspectives resulting in debates and conflicts over the truth 
claims. Not realising one's view of reality is skewed and limited each proclaims 
authority as far as the access to reality goes. This ugly human predicament, according to 
Jaina thinkers, can be resolved by adopting the theory of Anekantavada with its twin 
concepts approaches to reality — Nayavada and Syadvada — which stresses the 
coexistence of diverse groups with conflicting view points. It argues 
• 	that the universe is constituted by conflicting pairs like ignorance and wisdom, 
pleasure and pain, life and death. Life is made up of conflicting characters and people 
holding conflicting views and interests. Jainism seeks to resolve such clashes by 
reinforcing the coexistence of conflicting ideas. 
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• that things are both visible and invisible. Human beings accept what is visible 
and ignore what is invisible. As long as we fail to understand that things are constituted 
by both these characters we "cannot reach truth and justice." (Bhaskar 1999: 50) 
• That there is nothing that is absolutely similar or dissimilar, friend or enemy, 
good or bad. In every entity is a hidden infinite possibility. 
Jainism explains the position of ilnekeintavada by means of illustrating it through 
examples of an elephant and the six blind men. Each man approaches, understands and 
describes the elephant by touching certain parts. The man who touches the trunk 
explains that the elephant is like a `python'; the man who touches the leg describes it as 
a 'pillar'. Thus all six give six different descriptions of the elephant from their 
experience. Jainism proposes that all six descriptions are correct insofar as each accords 
with their experience of the elephant. However, insofar as none of them can grasp the 
concept of the elephant as a whole, all six men are wrong. Categorical metaphysical 
claims about the reality suffer from exactly the same problems. Hence the most 
plausible position is to make no categorical statements about reality, but to embrace 
various perspectives as qualities of reality. 
Jainism is deeply suspicious of metaphysics which claims a one-dimensional view 
of reality. As Lal et al., explain, such a position leads to many unpalatable 
consequences: "....one school refused to entertain the point of view of the other side 
holding it as false and considering only its own point of view as the gospel — absolute — 
truth. This" they say: "led to intolerance. Such dogmatist and intolerant approach is 
considered `elcant' or one-sided philosophical approach in Jaina view and such one-
sidedness is considered as equivalent to falsehood or false knowledge and false 
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perception — Mithya Gyan and Mithya Darshan."2° This approach is traditionally traced 
back to the Sfitrakrtariga, one of the earliest Jaina canons where it is said, "One who 
praises one's own view-point and discards other's view as a false-one and thus, distorts 
the truth will remain confined to the cycle of the birth and death." (Cited in Jain, 1999: 
37) Combining this metaphysical approach with Jaina ethics which stresses that the 
speech should be "unassaulting as well as true" we have MahavIra thus warning his 
disciples against employing "unwarranted categorical assertions or negations and 
instruct[ing] them to make only conditional statements (Vibhajjavaya Vagarejja)" 
(Jain, 1999: 37) Therefore it is quite obvious that the theory of Anekantavada seeks to 
synthesis and reconcile contradictory doctrines of various Brahmanical and non-
brahmanical schools of thought, in particular metaphysical standpoints of the 
Upanisadic and the Buddhist thinkers. In his Studies in Jaina Philosophy, Nathmal Tatia 
puts this argument more succinctly. The Upanisadic thinkers posit the eternal and 
immutable reality enduring behind plurality of worldly phenomena. Buddhism, on the 
other hand, posits momentary, constantly changing and essenceless (niljsvabhava) 
nature of all phenomena. And seeing his role as a synthesiser, Mahavira combined both 
views together — hence "Mahavira adhered to the common experience, found no 
contradiction between permanence and change." (1951: 18) 
Mahavira's arguments can be advanced in the following way: First, according to 
Sagarmal Jain, "For him [Mahavira] being and becoming — both are the aspects of the 
same reality. He defined reality as origination, decay and permanence." (1999: 20) Lal 
quotes the famous proposition of the Jaina Text - Tattvartha Sutra (5.29) "utpad vyaya 
dhrauvya yuktam sat", meaning, reality is characterised by origination, destruction as 
well as permanence. The implication suggests, as Lal argues, that reality is: 
20 http://wwwjainworld.com/jainbooks/firstep-2/anekantavad.htm  
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... not 'permanent' but also permanent, it is not only in a flux but also 
in a flux. Accordingly an object of knowledge must have three 
inseparable aspects. (i) a permanent substance - the inherent qualities 
(ii) destruction or abandonment of old shape and (iii) origination or 
acquisition of a new shape. 21 
Permanence of the reality of the phenomena is explained through an example of a gold 
ring. When the gold ring is destroyed, the actual gold ring is destroyed but not the gold, 
as there is "the continuing gold content", which according to Jainism is permanent. 
Thus the same gold is made into other jewelry such as earrings and so forth. 
Second, reality for Mahavira is characterised by a simultaneous operation of 
origination and destruction as well as permanence which is synthesised version of what 
is traditionally the extreme of eternalism (s'as'vatavada) and the extreme of nihilism 
(ucchedavada). In Bhagavatt Sutra, the dialogue between Gautama, a disciple of 
Mahavira, and the master himself clearly shows that for Mahavira the two extremes — 
eternalism and nihilism — are both acceptable. The dialogue reads: 
Are the souls, 0 Lord, eternal or non-eternal? The souls, 0 Gautama, 
are eternal in some respect and non-eternal in some respect. With what 
end in view, 0 Lord, is it so said that the souls are eternal in some 
respect and non-eternal in some respect? They are eternal, 0 Gautama, 
from the view-point of substance, and non-eternal from the view-point 
of modes. And with end in view it is said, 0 Gautama, that the souls are 
eternal in some respect and non-eternal in some respect. (vii. 2. 273) 22 
21 http://wwwjainworld.com/jainboolcs/firstep-2/anekantavad.htm  
22 When the Buddha was asked a similar question, he challenged the presupposition entailed in the 
question. The question assumes the existence of soul which is, according to the Buddha, nonexistent. 
Hence the quality of the soul being eternal or nonetemal makes no sense to the Buddha. It is like asking 
the colour of a sky flower which is totally nonexistent. 
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For Mahavira accepting both extreme resolves the metaphysical puzzle as to whether 
or not the universe is finite or infinite. He explains it with reference to four different 
angles: i) time ii) space iii) substance and iv) angle of form of objects. Jaina's synthesis 
of metaphysics of Upanisadic and Buddhist thoughts takes us right into to the heart of 
its conception of the causal thesis which seeks to synthesise the two seemingly 
contradictory causal theories - the arising from self and the arising from another. While 
the arising from self and the arising from another, if taken separately as fulfilling 
causal explanations is problematic (for being one-sided) yet the merger which brings 
together the arising from self and another as performing one act of producing resolves 
this problem. Hence in terms of a causal view, Jainism champions the arising from 
both — causation as result of both the arising from self and the arising from another. 
This means Jaina philosophy is committed to causal theory which asserts the arising 
from both multiple and singular cause. This does not mean that Jainism adopts the 
evolution theory of the Sathkhya tradition, which proposes Prakrti as the creator of the 
psycho-physical world. Nor does it mean that it adopts a Buddhist view of causation. 
What this means is that Jainism allows its causal explanation to accommodate both the 
metaphysics of Sathkhya philosophy and of some elements of Buddhism. As Jain 
Bhaskar points out, "the SathIchya philosophy upholds the view that substance and its 
quality are absolutely identical .... The Buddhist philosophy represents the view of 
difference.... According to Jaina philosophy, the conception of identity-cum-
difference is the solution to the problem." (1999: 54) 
Take the case of a clay pot. The clay is the substantial cause of a pot and all other 
conditions including the potter's labour, water and manufacturing wheel are the 
instrumental causes. The substantial cause — clay-matter — is, according to Jainism, a 
permanent entity since we can still find the matter of clay in the pot which is the effect. 
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However there are aspects of the causal process that are contingent, thus they change. 
Hence, according to this account the production is where "some old qualities have been 
lost, some new ones brought in, and there is some part in it which is permanent." 
(Dasgupta, 1951: 174) 
This example usefully illustrates the Jaina principle of Anekantavada being 
applied in the domain of causality. We can see this on several grounds. First, that the 
production is a combination of one — substantial cause — and many — instrumental 
conditions — since it is a collaborative effect of one substantial cause and multiple 
instrumental causes. All effects are essentially brought to bear from the combination of 
one and many causes as Radhakrishna explains: "Jaina claims that the potter has the 
idea (bhiiva) and the pot exists in his consciousness, and there arises the actual pot with 
the material clay." (1999: 323) Without the interplay of these two types of causes, there 
cannot be any causal process. "This is the rationale behind the Jaina claim that, every 
phenomenon excluding the souls or jivas, is made up of matter pudgala as the 
substantial cause. And pudgala," as Jacobi describes as, "of one kind and is able to 
develop into every thing." (1948: 72) 
Second, causality is a synthesis between what is metaphysically permanent — 
unchanging substance — on the one hand and what is metaphysically impermanent — 
constantly changing conditions — on the other. This is evident, Jaina claims, given that 
the substantial cause persists through time and can be seen as part of the effect. Hence 
clay essentially remains, even when it is turned into a pot. Whereas the instrumental 
causes such as heat while it helps to create the pot, it does not persist through time, does 
not become the pot. When the mud is turned into a pot it loses heat and becomes cold 
instead. Likewise, all other instrumental causes are impermanent since none of them 
retains their identity in the effectual state. Hence Ramjee Singh for example argues, 
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"Jaina describes the phenomena having the reality of identity-in-difference which both a 
permanent and changing entity manifests through constant change of appearance and 
disappearance." (Singh, n.d. 67) Further he argues, "that reality when looked at as the 
underlying permanent substance may be described as permanent but when viewed from 
the point of view of the modes (prayaya) which appear and disappear, it may be 
described as non-permanent and changing." (Singh, n.d. 67) 
Third, causality is a network between identical causes on the one hand and 
distinct causes on the other. In other words, it means that cause and effect are identical 
in one respect nevertheless distinct in another sense. The substantial cause, i.e., the clay, 
and the effect, i.e., the pot are identical given that the clay retains its identity even 
during its effectual stage. This is true, on this account, for the clay pot is after all a clay 
pot. That clay pot cannot have any other identity than being constituted by the clay. On 
the other hand the instrumental causes and the effect are distinct. The instrumental 
causes, say water, and the effect, clay pot, are certainly not perceived as the same. The 
clay pot which is the effect is perceived in every sense to be different from water. Water 
is liquid while pot is solid and the like. 
Fourth, causality is a link between what is causally eternal and what is causally 
non -eternal. The substantial cause is eternal since it does not cease to be whatever it is. 
The substantial cause i.e., the clay is eternally present in the clay pot. However the clay 
pot is not just a production from the clay it is due to other instrumental conditions. And 
these conditions are non-eternal with respect to the effect of the clay pot. This is 
because the instrumental causes are nonexistent in the effect, hence they are annihilated 
in the effectual state. In Prabha Vijaya's words, we read: "Truth tells us that every 
substance is characterized by the number of attributes and modifications. Its 
modifications are always changing, but its attributes which make it the particular 
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individual substance, remain throughout all these changes." (1948: 44) He further 
articulates the point: "Buddhism believes that everything is transient; this is perfectly 
true so far as the ever-present modifications of substances are concerned, but these 
modifications must depend upon some thing in which they are going on. That 
something remains one throughout its modifications." (1948: 44) 
Finally the Jaina claims phenomenon is produced both from the association of 
conditions and the non-association of conditions. This holds true, on the Jaina account, 
since all phenomena are products of atoms, but atoms themselves are not produced from 
the association of conditions. As Garji explains: "There cannot be a general rule that 
each and every object should be produced from samagri [association]. For objects 
composed of two or more atoms could be produced from the siimagri of those atoms, 
but a param(mu [atom] by itself, does never occupy space, and hence could never be 
produced from any samagri." (Gani, 1950: 247)23 
So these are some of the key arguments advanced by the Jaina to support the 
theory of arising from both self and another. Jaina thinkers are convinced that only by 
way of combining the two opposing causal theories would the causal problems faced by 
the Sailikhya, Abhidharmika and Carvaka be addressed. However, the Prasarigika 
Madhyamika have very different view of the Jaina causal theory to which I will turn 
next. 
2.2. Theory of Arising from Both Critiqued 
Let us now turn to the Prasangika's reaction against the Jaina casual theory. For the 
Prasatigika Madhyamika, the Jaina theory of causality is also philosophically 
unsustainable because it presupposes the metaphysical claims that all phenomena are 
23 Sarvam samagrimayam nada:into 'yarn yato'nurapradefh I 
Atha so 'pi sa-prad eIo yatravastha sa parama rtuh 
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constituted by two contradictory characteristics: permanence / change, eternalism / 
nihilism, identity / difference, singular / plural, self-caused / other-caused. Candrakirti's 
concluding remark of the Prasangika critique of the Jaina causality in his 
Madhyamalcavatara therefore reads as follows: "Arising from both is also patently 
unreasonable, because the faults already explained also accrue to this thesis. [Since 
arising from self and arising from another have been disproved], and this [third 
alternative] is untenable both from perspective of the worldly and ultimate truth." (MA 
6: 98)24 This causal account is untenable for Candrakirti since it suffers from the same 
logical problems as of the theory of arising from self and the theory of arising from 
another. This is so, since Jaina causality is a synthesis of the two problematic causal 
accounts into one fold and as such problems are quite inevitable. 
The first argument which attempts to show that the effect arises from the 
collaborative network between one substantial cause and the plurality of many 
instrumental conditions does not work. For this Jainism needs to show us that the 
substantial cause and the instrumental causes must be causally efficacious, able to 
function by interacting with each other like the seed (substantial cause) and instrumental 
causes such as water, heat, minerals etc. When the seed is planted in the soil, the seed 
undergoes changes to produce the sprout and eventually ceases to exist during its 
fruition. The substantial cause must be causally efficient during the causal state but 
eventually relinquishes its identity to produce the effect. However, this is not the case in 
Jaina's account. Nagarjuna points out that the so-called instrumental cause would lack 
any causal efficiency, it would fail to function as a cause. This is because it cannot be 
accepted as a cause as it cannot accommodate change that is necessary for the 
24 	_ 
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production of the effect to occur, and it cannot relinquish its identity once the effect is 
produced as it is conceived by Jaina as permanent and eternal. But that which utterly 
lacks the causal efficiency or "that which cannot perform causal function," Nagarjuna 
argues, "cannot be even considered as cause." (MMK 1.4)25 He further argues that 
"Conditions are so-called for the production depends upon them. That which does not 
produce is not even considered as condition." (MMK 1.5)26 This leaves only the 
instrumental causes, thus undermining Jaina's assertion that production is cooperation 
between the substantial and the instrumental cause given that the former lacks any 
causal efficiency. 
The second argument does not work either. Jaina claims that the substantial cause 
in question is permanent whereas the instrumental causes are impermanent and the 
effect is produced as a result of a causal relation existing between these two types of 
causes. From the Prasafigika perspective, this is entirely self-contradictory. A permanent 
substantial cause lacks any causal efficiency. It cannot be a cause, for it does not 
undergo any change whereas the real production of the effect does indeed need its cause 
to transform depending on the exposure to the conditions. Impermanent conditions will 
have no impact on the substantial cause, on this account, hence they too would lack any 
causal efficiency. Thus neither the substantial nor the instrumental causes nor the 
combination of the two will have any causal efficiency. Jainism concedes that the 
substantial and the instrumental causes taken separately do lack any causal efficiency, 
but claims that the combination of what is permanent and impermanent is causally 
effective. However, it is quite obvious that there is simply no causal network between 
the two types of causes. Illustrating the Prasangika points with the clay pot example, 
25 
26 
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Jainism claims that the substantial cause of the clay pot is permanent whereas the 
instrumental causes like water etc., are impermanent. If this claim is to be taken 
seriously than the clay pot is produced by collaboration between partly permanent and 
partly impermanent causes. If the substantial cause is permanent, then clay must not be 
subjected to the modifications, it must not undergo change when subjected to different 
conditions such as heat or water or even the potter's artistic hands. The fact that the clay 
can be modified and turned into any shape or color, virtually into any design is because 
it is entirely causally conditioned and that there is nothing in the clay that is permanent. 
The third Jaina argument tries to prove causality from synthesising identity and 
difference. It claims that in so far as the relationship of the substantial cause with its 
effect is concerned, they are identical. Whereas in so far as the relationship of the 
instrumental cause with its effect is concerned they are different. From the Prasatigika 
perspective this makes no sense. Nagrjuna criticises this view as follows. "Identity of 
cause and effect is never tenable." (MMK 20.19ab)27 "If cause and effect were identical, 
produced and producer would be identical."(MMK 20.20ab)28 If this is accepted, then 
the substantial cause and the effect would exist simultaneously. If this is accepted the 
so-called substantial cause would be redundant given that the existence of the effect 
already. Moreover, Jainas would be forced to accept the produced, such as a daughter 
and a sprout, are identical to their respective producers such as the father and the seed. It 
is also not reasonable to accept the instrumental cause and the effect as different. "The 
difference of cause and effect is never tenable." (MMK 20.19cd)29 "If cause and effect 
27 
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were different, cause and noncause would be alike."(MMK 20.20cd) 3° If the 
instrumental causes and the effect are entirely distinct, there would be no causal 
connection between them. If this is accepted, the claim that the instrumental causes of 
the clay pot such as water, heat etc and the clay pot as their effect would be baseless for 
there would be no causal link between the effect and the causes. In that case the so-
called instrumental causes would not be the cause after all. It would be just like any 
other unrelated noncausal phenomenon. If Jainism insists the instrumental causes and 
the effect are different yet they nevertheless function as causes, in that case, the 
Prasangika points out, Jainism would be forced to accept both light and darkness as the 
conditions for clear seeing. There would be no special causal connection between light 
and clear sight since they are different like darkness. 31 
The Jaina's fourth argument tries to demonstrate the production of the effect from 
two of the collaborative efforts of the two types of causes — one that is eternal in the 
effect and the other that is annihilated during the effect. For the Prasailgika this 
argument is also self-defeating. If the substantial cause is eternally present in the effect, 
the causal activity would be redundant for the effect and the cause would 
simultaneously exist. In that case the substantial cause would have no function to 
perform. But as Nagarjuna points out: "That which is an agent does not perform an 
existing action. Nor does that which is not an agent perform some nonexistent action." 
(MMK 8.1)32 If the causal activity of the substantial cause still requires to produce the 
effect, then the substantial cause cannot be eternally present in the effect. Further it is 
objected that whatever is eternal is by definition noncausal, for eternity implies 
30 
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permanence. And whatever is permanent is causally impotent as it cannot accommodate 
changes which is crucial for the causal process to take place. The Prasangika also 
objects to the Jaina claim that the instrumental causes are annihilated during the effect 
and points out if that is the case, for Jaina the effect too would be annihilated. If the 
parental reproductive cells are annihilated, the reproduced being also gets annihilated. 
Therefore Jainism's causality is always explained by the Prasarigika as a synthesis 
between the arising from self and the arising from another where the identity of the 
substantial cause and the identity of the effect are one and same (while the identity of 
the instrumental cause and the effect are always distinct). That being the case the 
production of the clay pot from the clay which is not other than the clay-pot is the 
arising of the clay pot from itself, hence the clay pot is partly self caused. The 
objections against this view are discussed in detail in Chapter 1. All the fallacies of the 
SanIkhya's causal account can also be applied to Jaina's account insofar as it claims the 
identity of the substantial cause and the effect. Jaina however claims that the 
relationship between the instrumental causes and the clay pot is one of essentially 
another. The causes such as heat, water etc., and the effect in question are distinct yet 
causally efficient. In spite of their inherent otherness, the instrumental causes produce 
the clay pot. Hence in this respect, the clay pot is partly caused by another — something 
other than itself. This according to the Prasangika amounts to claiming that the clay pot 
is partly produced from another cause. This is also rejected by the Prasangika. Recall 
the detailed critique discussed in Chapter 2 can again be applied here in this context. 
It is therefore clear that Jaina's causal account makes little sense to the 
Prasafigika. Although it is somewhat innovative on Jaina's part to synthesis 
contradictory causal theories — the theory of arising from self and the theory of arising 
from another — and try to explain causal process it does not succeed, at least according 
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to the Prasatigika's reading of its account. It suffers from all sorts philosophical and 
logical inconsistencies as demonstrated above. 
3.1. Carvaka's Causal Theory 
Now I will turn to the theory of causeless causation. The exponent of this theory is the 
heterodox school of Indian Materialist / Carvaka in Indian Philosophy and it is 
significant as the only school that denies the validity of karma and rebirth. (Tatia, 1951: 
220) The school is also known as Lokayata, for the reason "it holds that only this world 
(loka) exists and there is no beyond." (Radhakrishnan and Moore, 1957: 227) According 
to Carvaka philosophy, sensual pleasure is the only end of human beings. Carvaka does 
not accept the afterlife as a separate state of being but only as earthly suffering. 
Liberation is the dissolution of the body as death is the end of all. Carvala denies the 
validity of most knowledge which derives from the senses. Inference has no value and 
the scriptures are false. What cannot be seen does not exist. There are no other worlds as 
they cannot be perceived. 
The lack of original text of the school poses a major problem for any serious 
research undertakens on Carvaka causality. The Tattvopaplavasiritha of Jayaragi Bhatta 
(600 C.E.) which was discovered only in the third decade of the twentieth century, is 
accepted as the only extant and authentic text of the Carvaka. (Mittal, 1974: 23) This 
text however, does not fill the gap of the understanding the whole tradition. It is marked 
by textual incoherence and logical inconsistency. Still those ideas are appropriated and 
cited in the early works of other traditions. In fact the doctrines currently attributed to 
Carvaka school are largely traced from the secondary sources, particularly the works of 
its opponents and critics. According to Mittal, the author of Indian Materialist, the 
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following texts are the secondary sources of Carvaka philosophy: Sarvamatasarhgraha, 
Tattvasathgraha of aritaraksita, Candrakirti's Madhyamakavatara, 
Sarvadars'anasarhgraha of Madhavacarya, Sacklarfana Samuccaya of Haribhadra Sun, 
Sarvasiddheintasarasarhgraha attributed to arplcaracarya, Sarvadarianakaumudi of 
Madhava Sarasvati, Raimayana, Mahabharata, Padamapureina, Visrtupuraha, 
Manusmrti, Kautiltya-Arthafastra, Barhaspatya-Arthaktstra, Vatsayana' s Ktimasatra, 
Brahma sutra Bhaskara Bheasya. (Mittal, 1974: 24-25) 
In terms of philosophical orientation Jayatilleke (2004: 71-72) noted that modern 
scholars have classified the school of Carvaka or Indian materialism into three 
categories: 
• those who upheld the validity of perception alone and denied inference and other 
forms of knowledge, 
• those who upheld the validity and priority of perception, but admitted inference 
only in a limited sense, denying other forms of knowledge, 
• those who denied all means of knowledge including perception. 
Information about the first school is traced to the works of Madhava Acarya's (1400 
C.E.) Sarvadarfanasarngraha where it is said that "this school holds that perception is 
the only source of knowledge' (pratyaksaikapramcinavaditaycl)." (Cited in Jayatilleke, 
2004: 72) The second school is attributed to the works of Punrandara in Kamalasila's 
Tattvasarhgrahapaiyika): "Purandara says that it is well known that even the 
Materialists accept inference although they object to people (kaikit) employing 
inference beyond the limits of sense-perception (lit, beyond the path of this world.)"33 
The same view is attributed to Lokayata by S. N. Dasgupta: "Purandara — admits the 
33 	Purandaras tvaha, lokaprasiddham anumanam Carvakairapisyata evayattu kaiscillaukikam 
margamatikramya anumanamucyate tannisidhyate. 
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usefulness of inference in determining the nature of all worldly things where perceptual 
experience is available, but inference cannot be employed for establishing any dogma 
regarding the transcendental world, of life after death, or the law of karma which cannot 
be available to ordinary perceptual experience." (1952: 539) Carvaka's second school 
claims the existence of the four elements: earth, water, fire and air. It argues that 
everything is composed of these four elements including the consciousness. Carvaka 
denies the reality of all abstract concepts such as vice and virtue, or causation. It claims 
that it is in the 'nature' (svabhava) of things themselves to undergo transformation by 
themselves (svatah). This school therefore adopts a view which states things come into 
being due to their essential nature without specific and definite causal explanation. 
Carvaka affirms the doctrine of causeless nature of thing by admitting to the validity of 
perception and inference. It is quite clear from this point that the Carvaka tradition, or at 
least one school, admits the "perception and empirical inference but discards 
metaphysical inference on the grounds that what was in principle unperceivable is 
unknowable." (Jayatilleke, 2004: 77) The third school — denial of all means of 
knowledge — is attributed to the Lokayata in the works of Jayaragi's 
Tattvopaplavasidtha. According to Jaytilleke "He [Jayaragi] seems to deny the real 
existence of both this world as well as the next, in denying the reality of all tattvas and 
his work as its name implies is intended to 'upset all principles' (tattvaupaplava-) 
epistemological as well as ontological, and he claims to have done so at the end of his 
work (tadevam upaplutesu tattvesu)." (2004: 82) 
Interestingly however, a Tibetan commentator, Jamyang Shepai Dorje, claims that 
one out of three schools of Carvalca accepts the existence of Gods, former and future 
Page 70 of 125 
lives. (1992: 93) 34 Although he does not mention the original source of this claim it 
does seem to contradict the traditional views attributed to Carvaka school. Even the 
term Lokayata would not apply to this school if the claim is right, after all the school 
would be concerned about the after life. This claim also contradicts the Carvaka denial 
of inference. Since the proof for after life must be based on the inferential reasonings. 
3.2. Critique of Carvaka's Causal Theory 
The Carvaka epistemology has an enormous impact on their metaphysics of the world, 
in particular the causality of this and the next world. From the Prasatigika perspective, 
the first school of CaryAka, because it recognises perception as the only valid means of 
knowledge, and categorically denies the validity of inference, makes causal explanation 
impossible. This follows because the causal process is not directly perceivable, since the 
relation between the cause and the effect is not accessible direct perception. Without 
relying upon inference, the relationship between the cause and the effect, the existence 
of causal process is not feasible. However this lack of causal explanation is not a 
problem for the first school. In fact the denial of the validity of inference is precisely to 
deny the existence of anything that is occult, not directly accessible to the senses, 
including causality and ultimately to deny the existence of afterlife as the karmic 
consequence of this life. In fact it can be argued that a primary drive for the Carvakas to 
deny inference is to deny the existence of the future life. If inference is accepted as a 
valid means of knowledge, according to the first Carvaka school, one cannot escape the 
dilemma of accepting the existence of entities that are metaphysically occult or hidden. 
Then there will be no valid ground for rejecting the afterlife since one would be forced 
34 
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to use inference to explain the causal connection between this life and next life. And 
Carvaka is not prepared to take this risk. 
The third Carvaka school is, according to the Prasatigika Madhyamika, absolutely 
nihilistic. No epistemological or metaphysical account whatsoever, including causality 
is tenable for a view which rejects the validity of all means of knowledge, including 
perception. Rejecting the existence of all means of knowledge is to deny the possibility 
of ever knowing anything about the world, let alone providing any account of causality. 
Hence Jayatilleke describes Jayaragi's school as "the nihilist school of pragmatic 
materialists." (2004:91) 
Generally the Prasangika Madhyamikas have critiqued Carvaka as causal nihilist, 
for instance, Nagarjuna in his first verse of Malamadhyamakakarika categorises 
Carvaka under a causal nihilist. 35 In the texts it is always presupposed that Carvaka's 
primary thesis entails the denial of causation, or causal explanation. Hence the 
Madhyamika has always attacked Carvakas from the point of view of causation. 
Therefore Nagarjuna, in his Mfilamadhyamakakarika and Candrakirti in 
Madhyamakeivatara concisely put the objections in the form of following reductios: 
• If production is due to the absence of a cause, then it follows that anything could 
be produced anywhere at anytime, hundreds of thousands of seeds planted by farmers 
for the purpose of growing crops would result in no harvest whatsoever. (MA 6. 99) 
• If the world is absent of any causes [for its existence], then like the colour or 
scent of a lotus growing in mid air, surely it would not be perceived as existent. The 
world is however perceived in all its rich variety, and thus it must be conceded that the 
world is produced from causes. (MA 6.100) 
35 Ala svato napi parato na dvabhy(on napy ahetutalt, utpanna jam vidyante bhavalz kvacanakecana. 
(Kalupahana, 1991: 105) 
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• It would be contradictory for the Carvaka to deny the existence of the afterlife 
since the afterlife is posited through the inference which it rejects and that perception is 
accepted as the only means of knowledge. This reductio makes sense because through 
perception it is not possible to conceive the non-existence of afterlife. Hence it would be 
even inconsistent for them to reject the afterlife. 
The second school affirms, to a certain extent, the validity of both perceptual and 
inferential knowledge. From the Prasangika point of view, even this moderate Carvaka 
school cannot offer us a plausible causal explanation. This school has to provide us a 
plausible explanation why only certain forms of inference are acceptable while other 
forms are not. The Prasangika Madhyamika points out that the domain of inference is 
the object of knowledge that are unmanifestly hidden or occult, hence not accessible to 
direct perception; whereas the domain of perception is the object of knowledge that are 
more manifestly apparent that do not require inferential cognitive exercise to access 
them. Just as the scope of perception as a means of knowledge is determined by the 
scope of the manifest object of knowledge but not by the faculty of perception itself, 
likewise the scope of inference is dependent on the scope of the occult object of 
knowledge requiring inferential cognition rather than an ideologically imposed arbitary 
demarcation. And because the second Carvala school employs arbitary means to reject 
or accepts certain forms of inferential knowledge without offering us a sufficient 
explanation, it is fair to conclude that even this school does not have a coherent causal 
explanation. Moreover, its causal account hinges on the ultimate existence of four 
elements and their intrinsic functional capacity, unique to the elements themselves. This 
account is open to the same objections the Prasangika raised against the reificationism / 
essentialism discussed in Chapter 2. This follows because according to this school, these 
four essential elements are the causes of worldly phenomena in that the four elements 
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possess inherent causal power to produce the phenomenal world. And the Prasangika 
Madhyamika has consistently rejected such a causal power in all the chapters. 
4. Conclusion 
In this chapter I have attempted to raise the problems associated with causal theories of 
the two heterodox schools of India, namely, Jainism's causal view which seeks to 
combine the arising from self and another, and Carvaka's view of causeless causality. 
While Jainism insists that things arise from both self and another and the Prasangika 
critiques this view and charges it of committing the same errors as that of the causal 
theories of Sarialchya and the Abhidharmikas on the ground that this causal theory is a 
synthesis of two radically opposed and untenable causal theories. Carvaka's causeless 
causality is also attacked by the Prasatigika as totally nihilistic, in that it does not offer 
any causal explanation, hence it does not serve any purpose whatseover. 
This brings us to the closure of the Prasatigika's critique of causality. We have 
witnessed that it rejects Sarilkhya's causal theory which asserts the identity of cause and 
effect (theory of arising from self), it rejects the Abhidharmika's causal account which 
insists on the distinctness of cause and effect (theory of arising from another), it rejects 
Jainism's causal account which proposes a synthesised causality of identity and 
distinctness of cause and effect (theory of arising from both self and another) and finally 
it rejects Carvalca's causal theory which insists on things are causeless. In the next two 
chapters, I will examine the theory of dependent arising as the Pra- sangika's own 
alternative account of causality. Chapter 4 will demonstrate the Prasatigika arguments 
for the categorical rejections of causal theories inspired by the essentialist metaphysics 
and shows why essence is incompatible with the theory of dependent arising as a causal 
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thesis. Hence it will be argued that essence must be rejected on all counts to formulate a 
causal thesis of dependent arising. Chapter 5 will examine two central arguments of the 
Prasatigika for dependent arising as the alternative causal thesis and will demonstrate 
the ways in which dependent arising provides, according to the Prasaligika, plausible 
explanations for the causal processes involved in both the external and the mental 
worlds. 
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Chapter 4 
Theory of Dependent Arising - I 
1. Introduction 
Does the Prasatigika Madhyamika have a causal thesis? 
According to Madhyamika philosophy, the essential production of an entity must 
necessarily be confined to four possible alternatives. The first (the arising from self), the 
third (the arising from both) and the fourth (the arising from neither, namely causeless) 
alternatives, as I have sshown in previous chapters, are unanimously rejected by all the 
Buddhist schools of thought. However the Buddhist reificationist schools of Vaibhasika, 
Sautrantika and Cittamatra proposes the second alternative (the arising from another). 
Of the two schools of Madhyamaka, scholars of Svatantrika Madhyamaka, while 
rejecting three other alternatives, posits the arising from another. It is important to note 
however that this school posits the arising from another only conventionally and that it 
rejects arising from another in an ultimate sense. The Prasarigika Madhyamikas, on the 
other hand, reject all four causal accounts, both ultimately and conventionally. The 
Prdsatigika Madhyamika's total rejection of the four problematic causal accounts does 
not imply that the school is against all possible causal accounts. As I will show in the 
next chapter Prasangika Madhyamika does indeed advance its own causal account based 
on the theory of dependent arising. This understanding is crucial here. Misinterpreting 
the Prasatigika's sweeping refutation of the four causal theories as implying a total 
denial of all possible causal theories led the Buddhist reificationists to a particular set of 
beliefs and alleged that the Prasangika are nihilistic about causality. The reificationists 
falsely proposed that Prasatigika lacks any positive causal thesis and that it is totally 
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against such an account (Nagarjuna, MMK 24.1-6). The Prasatigika Madhyamika rejects 
this allegation and claims (a) that it does have dependent arising as a legitimate causal 
thesis and (b) that this thesis is founded on the rejection of svabhava (Tib. rang bzhin) 
'essence', therefore affirming everything as empty (Skt. s'finya, Tib. stong pa). I will 
turn to thesis (a) and examine the arguments supporting the dependent arising thesis 
fully in Chapter 5. The purpose of this Chapter is to interrogate the Prdsatigika's 
premises supporting thesis (b). So essentially this chapter will analyse the Prasatigika's 
conceptual grounds for proposing dependent arising as its causal explanation. A close 
examination of the four alternative causal theses followed by the Prasatigika's critiques 
I have presented in Chapter 1, 2, and 3 settle many questions concerning what the 
Prasaftgika's causality is not, without giving an affirmative account of the what the 
Prdsangika's causality is. The purpose of my analyses in the previous chapters is to 
provide the Prasatigika's reaction towards the causal theses proposed in other Indian 
schools of thought. And as we have noticed the Prasatigika's reaction towards them is 
categorically negative, hence the method of refutation is thoroughly by means of a 
reductio ad absurdum. The purpose of Chapter 4 is to explain what is so far not made 
obvious — i.e., the conceptual relationship between the Prasangika's refutation of 
causality underpinned by the svabhava "essence" notion with the theory of dependent 
arising, (the affirmative causal account of the Prasatigika school). To put the point 
across differently, the task of this chapter is the explain: What is the significance of the 
Prasangika's rejection of svabhava? How does this refutation assist the Prasatigika to 
explain the causal process of dependent arising? I will argue that for the Prasatigika, the 
rejection of svabhava is absolutely critical to establish dependent arising as an 
alternative causal thesis. 
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2. Critique of Essence (svabhava / rang bzhin) 
We will begin with the question: what is the Prasangika Madhyamaka's conception of 
svabhava and why does it contradict Prasatigika's metaphysics of dependent 
origination? As I have discussed breifly in beginning of Chapter 2, the Sanskrit term 
svabhava (Tib. rang bzhin) has the sense of "essence" (Garfield, 1995: 220) "intrinsic 
being" or "intrinsic nature" (Huntington, 1989: 48), "inherent existence" (Hopkins, 392, 
438). Following Nagarjuna's Malamadhyamakakarika, a Sakyapa commentator 
Gorampa, characterises svabhava as possessing three features: that which is not arisen 
from the conditions (ngo ho rkyen gyis bskyed pa ma yin pa) unlike the heat of water; 
that which is not posited in relation to other phenomena (rnam jug gzhan la ltos pa ma 
yin pa) unlike the relativistic positing of long and short, former and latter; and that 
which is an unchanging (gzhan du gyur pa ma yin pa) unlike the changing costumes of 
artists. (Gorampa, 2002: 324)36 Garfield defines essence as "eternal, fixed and 
independent." (1995: 111) He further adds, "For a phenomenon to have an essence is for 
it to have some permanent independent core. So, neither essences nor phenomena with 
essences can emerge from conditions." (1995: 111) 
In Tibetan philosophy, interpreters have adopted various expressions to capture 
the meanings associated with the term svabhava — "ultimate existence" (paramartha, 
don dam par grub pa), "established by virtue of its own reality (tattva-siddhi, de kho na 
nyid du grub pa), "established through the power of its own ultimate" (samyak-siddhi, 
yang dag par grub pa), "true existence" (satya-sat, bden par yod pa), "true 
establishment" (satya-siddhi, bden par grub pa), "establishment by virtue of own 
characteristics" (svalaksharta-siddhi, rang gi mtshan nyid kyis grub pa), "establishment 
36 
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by virtue of inherent existence" (svabhava-siddhi, rang bzhin gyis grub pa), 
"establishment by virtue of its own power" (svaritpa-siddhi, rang ngos nas grub pa) et 
al. They argue that, for the Prasangika, all these terms are expressions referring to 
svabhava. (Gorampa, 2001: 91) Making no metaphysical distinction whatsoever 
between their referents, the school rejects such existence both ultimately and 
conventionally. Gelugpa however claims that Svatantrika Madhyamika accepts the last 
three as conventionally existent and ultimately nonexistent. (Hopkins, 1996: 39) 
In order to fully understand Prasatigika's arguments justifying this rejection, it is 
critical for us to turn our attention to the problems of accepting svabhava in the context 
of causality as they are explored in Prasangika philosophy. For this we turn to 
NagArjuna. In his magnum opus Midamadhyamakakarika (Fundamental Verses of 
Middle Way) Nagarjuna devotes an entire chapter to his critique of essential arising. 
And he provides the following grounds for the rejecting of causality founded on the 
assumption of the existence of svabhava. 
Essence arising from causes and conditions makes no sense. 
Essence arisen from causes and conditions would be created (MMK 
15.1)37 
This argument states that essence must be rejected because essence and arising from the 
conditions are mutually exclusive. Essence, as pointed out earlier presupposes causal 
independence, a kind of causal autonomy. Thus it has a strong sense of being causally 
"uncreated" (ma bcos pa), or unconditioned. Whereas it is true that conditions making 
the arising possible would be unnecessary if the arising is due to the power of essence, 
the fact that conditions are absolutely necessary for the arising to occur implies that the 
37 	
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I used Samten and Garfield's (2006: 315) translation. 
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arising is not due to the power of some causal essence. Commenting on Nagarjuna's 
verse Tsongkhapa writes: "Since the two —being created and being uncreated — are 
mutually exclusive, if one is eliminated in one basis the other must be affirmed in that 
basis." (2006:315) Tsonglchapa further states, "what is created is characterised as 
constructed, whereas essence, which is nature, is characterised as unconstructed. Being 
created and being essence cannot co-exist on the same basis, like the heat of water..." 
(2006:315). Even in ordinary discourse, if something is constructed we describe it as 
artificial but not as its nature or essence. If a vicious person pretends to be 
compassionate, we call her a hypocrite on the grounds of her pretence of possessing 
compassionate virtue. However, if a genuinely compassionate person acts 
compassionately we don't call her a hypocrite. Commonsense understanding is that she 
embodies compassionate virtue. The Prasatigika Madhyamika uses a similar argument, 
although on a different level. While it is true that in ordinary discourse heat is 
understood as the essence or nature of fire, in the language of the Prasatigika system 
heat is not the essence of fire. In fact heat does not have any essence. Fire is essentially 
empty of heat. Heat is causally produced since it is dependent on such things as burning 
fuel as its causes and conditions. If the heat of fire existed essentially, then it would be 
untenable for the fire to arise in dependence upon fuel as its condition. To sum up the 
points made in this argument Nagarjuna states: 
"How could it be appropriate to call that which is created 'essence?' 
Essence itself is not constructed and does not depend on another." 
(MMK 15.2) (2006: 317) 
Further: 
If something exists essentially, then it could not become nonexistent. 
Page 80 of 125 
Essence transforming into something other could never be tenable. (MMK 
15.8)38 
In this argument, the Prasatigika rejects causal essence through two interrelated 
premises: (a) untenability of essence to become nonexistent and (b) untenability of 
essence to transform into something other than itself. Both these premises are critical 
for any causal process to occur. Premise (a) makes sense on the ground that the essence 
of heat of fire cannot become nonexistent because its cessation is untenable. This 
follows because cessation depends on cessation of its conditions and essence must not 
depend on conditions. Premise (b) also makes sense because essence cannot become 
something other than itself since transforming into something else would require 
relinquishing its essence. However, the causal process is untenable without 
transforming the identity of cause. Thus, essence is unacceptable for the Prasatigika 
school for the fact that it does not have any capability to produce its effect. But we do 
observe that fire transforms every moment and that it ceases to be hot when the fuel is 
used up because the heat of the fire is not essentially existent. Let us turn to 
Nagarjuna's next argument: 
To say "it exists" is to eternalism. 
To say "it does not exist" is to adopt the view of nihilism. 
Therefore a wise person 
Does not subscribe to "it exists" or "it does not exit." (MMK 15.10)39 
In this argument Nagarjuna makes it clear that the Prasatigika, referred to in this verse 
as "a wise person" who is committed to the middle way philosophy must reject essence 
38 
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The translation of this verse is taken from Samten and Garfield (2006: 323). 
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Samten and Garfield's (2006: 324) translation of this verse. 
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on two further grounds: (a) reificationism and (b) nihilism. This is because essence, 
according to Nagarjuna, leads to an absurdity of (a) metaphysical reificationism. 
Whatever exists by definition must exist essentially, hence there is no reason for it to 
cease to exist for ever, thus it must exist eternally. The same essence, according to 
Nagarjuna, leads to (b) a metaphysical nihilism. Whatever is nonexistent must by 
definition nonexist essentially, hence there is no reason for it to ever arise and become 
existent, thus eternally nihilistic. 
3. Compatibility of Causality and Emptiness / Essencelessness 
So, what we have seen thus far is the Prasatigika's arguments rejecting the causal power 
of essence based on the thesis that causality and essence are incompatible. What this 
implies is that for the Prasatigika, causality and emptiness of essence are compatible. 
But how do Prasatigika proponents explain the relationship between causality and 
emptiness of essence? Addressing this question is critical for the Prasatigika for two 
important reasons. Since the Prasangika Madhyamika categorically rejects essence, it is 
possible to lend this rejection to (a) a thesis that holds the Prasatigika school has no 
view whatsoever in terms of causality or (b) a thesis that holds the Prasarigika school is 
committed to the view of the essence of the essencelessness — the view that holds 
sTinyatc7 as ultimately existent. But the Prasangika asks why should either of these 
conclusions follow? 
Let us first understand the reasons why thesis (b) does not follow from the 
rejection of essence. The fact that Prasatigika argues that causality is empty of any 
essence, it should not automatically follow from this thesis that this school accepts the 
emptiness thesis as some form underlying essence. This school uses two forms of 
justifications to avoid such a problematic consequence from occurring. First, the more 
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straightforward justification is the Prasangika's identification of emptiness of essence 
with dependent arising. Emptiness and dependent arising are argued as having identical 
implications. (I will return to this later). 
The second justification comes from the type of negation that is involved in 
negating the essence. This argument comes from Tsongkhapa's Ocean of Reasoning. 
(2006: 55) In it he argues that the Prasangika's negation of arising by virtue of essence 
is a form of an external negation (Tib. med dgag) - which is a mere negation without 
entailing any affirmation. This is to argue that when the object of negation, namely the 
arising through essence, is eliminated no other phenomena is affirmed or projected as its 
consequence. Consequently the Prasangika's negation of the essential arising of 
phenomena, according to Tsongkhapa, does not force the school to accept the 
essencelessness or emptiness as an underlying reality or essence. On the other hand, if 
the kind of negation used here to negate essence is an internal negation (ma yin dgag) — 
a negation which does indeed affirm or project something as its consequence — 
emptiness of essence would itself indeed becomes an underlying essence. If that is the 
case the Prasangika would be denying one essence while accepting another form of 
essence. But this is not the case since it is commitment to empty metaphysics given that, 
on this account, emptiness would not be empty after all. 
The doctrine of the emptiness of emptiness (Skt. s'anyatagiinyata, Tib. stong pa 
nyid stong pa nyid) provides us with the reason: "If there were even the slightest bit 
nonempty, emptiness itself would be the slightest bit existent. But when not there is not 
even the slightest nonempty thing, how could emptiness exist?" (MMK 13.7)4° 
Commenting on this point Candrakirti writes: "The absence of essence of all things is 
40 	 The 
translation is taken from Samten and Garfield (2006: 297). 
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itself referred to by wise men as 'emptiness' and this emptiness also is posited to be 
empty of the essence of emptiness" (MA 6.185).41 Furthermore the very purpose of 
teaching the emptiness of emptiness is to overcome the gasping to the view of 
emptiness, hence Nagarjuna reminds us: "The victorious ones have declared that 
emptiness relinquishes all views. Anyone who is possessed by the view of emptiness is 
incurable" (MMK 13.18). 42 The very reason of teaching the emptiness of emptiness, 
which is comparable to medicine prescribed to cure illness, is to set us free from the 
grasping to emptiness, whereas grasping to emptiness as an underlying absolute reality 
is comparable to medicine turned into poison which is incurable. 
In the Maharatnalaita Sutra (The Sutra of Assembled Treasures) the Buddha 
offers some explicit warnings with striking similes concerning the dangers associated 
with attachment to the view of emptiness. 
Positive view is better than the view of emptiness: 
'If one thinks that he has realised emptiness and becomes attached to 
emptiness, then he regresses in the pursuit of the Buddha-dharma. 
Thus, Kagyapa, it is better for one to take a view of the self as massive 
as Mount Sumeru than to take a view of emptiness and become 
arrogant. Why? Because all views can be eliminated by emptiness, but 
if one gives rise to the view of emptiness, there is no way to do away 
with it' (Maharatnakrita Sutra 20.395-6) 
Emptiness-view cannot be eradicated: 
`Kagyapa, if a physician gives his patient some medicine to purge an 
illness, but the medicine stays in the body instead of being discharged, 
what do you think? Will the patient get better? No... the patient's 
41 
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illness will become worse if the medicine is not discharged. In like 
manner, Kagyapa, all views can be eliminated by emptiness, but the 
view of emptiness cannot be eradicated' (Maheiratnakilta Sutra, 20. 
396). 
Why scared of emptiness? 
'Suppose a person is afraid of empty space and wails in grief and 
pounds his chest, saying, "I want to escape from empty space!" What 
do you think? Can one escape from empty space? Similarly, Kagyapa, 
if a person is afraid of the doctrine of emptiness, I say he is crazy and 
has lost his mind. Why do I say so? Because he is always in emptiness, 
and yet is afraid of it. 
Just as a painter paints a picture of demons and then faints at the sight 
of his own creation, so ordinary people fabricate forms, sounds, odors, 
tastes, and textures, and then wander in sarhsara afflicting themselves 
with all kinds of suffering without knowing it. 
Just as a magician produces an illusory being and then is devoured by 
it, so a monk who follows the path engenders the view that all dharmas 
are empty, still, and insubstantial; and then he, the viewer, is also 
voided by the view' (Maharatnakiita Sutra, 20. 396) 
Further: 
Matijugri said to [a deva], "Son of heaven, I will not discourse to those 
who like to listen, nor to those who accept what they have heard. Why? 
Because those who like to listen and those who accept a discourse are 
attached. To what are they attached? They are attached to a self, a 
personal identity, a sentient being, a life, and a person. Being attached, 
they accept what they have heard. It should be known that those who 
accept what they have heard abide in three bonds. What are the three? 
The view of a self, the view of a sentient being and the view of 
dharmas" (The Maharatnakata SCara 2, pp. 48) 
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So it is clear that clinging to the view of emptiness is a sign of failed understanding of 
the meaning of emptiness. And to this extent the Prasatigika Madhyamika clearly issues 
the warning against clinging to the view of emptines. This however does not imply that 
the Prasatigika generally does not endorse any view to which I will turn my attention 
next. 
Now I will turn to the arguments demonstrating why PrAsangika does not endorse 
thesis (a) — which states that the Prasatigika has no causal thesis whatsoever. It is a 
common notion that Prasangika philosophy only uses reductio ad absurdum to merely 
refute the causal views of other systems and does not have a causal thesis of its own. 
This conclusion is inspired by the statements such as these: 
If I had any thesis then 
I would have that fault. 
I have no thesis therefore 
I am only faultless. (Nagarjuna, Vigrahavyavartant, 29) 
Also: 
If there is a substantial thesis, 
attachment, hatred arise, 
inexhaustible erroneous views arise. 
From these arise disputes. (Nagarjuna, Yuktisa,stika 46) 
Taking the meaning of these verses literally, a modern commentator T.R.V. Murti in his 
The Central Philosophy of Buddhism, draws this conclusion: "The Madhyamika is a 
prdsangika or vaitarjclika, a dialectician or free-lance debater. The Madhyamika 
disproves the opponent's thesis, and does not prove any thesis of his own." (1980:131) 
A.B. Keith writes: "Nagarjuna denies consistently that he has any thesis of his own, for 
to uphold one would be wholly erroneous... He confines himself to reducing every 
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positive asserting to absurdity." (1979: 239) Louis de la Vallee Poussin in his article 
'Nihilism (Buddhist)' come to this conclusion: "there is no doubt that the absolute truth 
(paramarthasalya) of the extreme Buddhist and of the extreme Vedantist is an 
unqualified negation of the world of appearance, a negation of existence (sarhsara)." 
(Cited in Lopez, 1987: 48) Many Tibetan scholars came to a similar conclusion. 
Garfield (2002) as one such scholar notes in his Empty Words Ngog blo ldan Shes rab. 
According to Ngog, Garfield argues, "Nagarjuna means just what he says. The central 
teaching of Madhyamaka is that one should relinquish all views, and that if 
Madhyamaka becomes a philosophical view, one has fundamentally missed its point." 
(2002: 48) These examples sufficiently demonstrate to us the tendency to attribute a no-
position thesis, thus no causal thesis whatsoever to the Prasangika Madhyamika. 
Other Tibetan philosophers such as Tsongkhapa and Gorampa while they make no 
such allegations nevertheless respond to these statements differently. According to 
Tsongkhapa, the meaning of Nagarjuna's statements (proposing the no-view thesis) 
only means that the Prasatigika does not hold the essentialist / foundationalist view of 
any sort. The statements must not be taken literally. Doing so undermines the 
Prasangika's commitment to right view (sarnyak dr,sti /yang dag pa '1 lta ba) based on 
doctrines such as of emptiness, selflessness, dependent arising, compassion, loving-
kindness. And nobody denies that. For Gorampa, on the other hand, these verses mean 
that the Prasangika Madhyamika is positionless on the ultimate level. There is no 
contradiction ultimately (don dam la ltos te lies pa spong ba). 43 (Gorampa, 2001: 103) 
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Ultimately the Prdsarigika does not have any thesis to advance. Hence all four lemmas" 4 
(Skt. catutskoti, Tib. mu bzhi/mtha' bzhi) need to be rejected. (2001: 104) Furthermore, 
Gorampa argues that the positionless concept can be understood in two ways. First is 
positionless after refuting the essentialist position. This is understood within the context 
of the debate between the Prasafigika and the essentialist opponent who advances an 
essential position. Given that the Prasangika rejects all essentialist notions through 
reductios and given that it does not propose any position of its own, it would have no 
position to hold in the context of the debate. Second is positionless due to the refutation 
of the Svatantrika Madhyamaka's position. The opponent Svatantrika Madhaymika is, 
while rejecting the essentialist position, nonetheless committed to a non-essentialist 
position, i.e., essencelessness established via syllogistic argument. 
In my view, Tsonglchapa and Gorampa are correct on their own terms. 
Tsongkhapa's position makes sense. It is quite obvious that the Prasatigika does not 
have an essentialist position. But they do not just refute other philosophers and accuse 
them of being reificationist or idealists. The Prasatigika advocates a middle position that 
is free from the extremes of nihilism and reification, essentialism and idealism. 
Gorampa is also correct in saying that the Prasatigika does not have any ultimate thesis 
because such a position is not established under the rational analysis of authoritative 
cognition. 
So at the heart of the Prasangika Madhyamika's unequivocal denial of essential 
causation is its commitment to empty metaphysics. Simply stated this school claims that 
empty causes produce empty effects like a reflection of a face in the mirror. Candrakirti 
in his work, Madhyamaktivateirabheiya argues that while a reflection of a face in the 
mirror is empty of a real face, a reflection of face in the mirror nevertheless arises due to 
44 Madhyamikas use fourfold tetra lemma to deconstruct the phenomena and they are: 1) x is not existent, 
2) x is not non existent, 3) x is both existent and nonexistent, 4) x is not neither. 
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the nexus between its causes and conditions. Not only is the reflection of a face empty 
of a real face, causes and conditions that produce such reflection are as a matter of fact 
themselves empty of face's svabhava (MA 6.37, 38ab) (1999: 124) 
4. Middle Path: Dependent Arising and Emptiness 
So dependent arising, in the Madhyamika's view, is the affirmation of things' lack of 
essential existence. All phenomena are dependent on their causes and conditions for 
their existence, endurance and cessation. They are also dependent on language and 
thought. For the essentialist however, the Prasarigika's refutation of the essence would 
mean the denial of the very existence of things. Thus the essentialist charges the 
Prasatigika as nihilistic, by insisting that if phenomena are empty, then for the 
Madhyamikas, suffering, origin of suffering, cessation of suffering, path leading to 
cessation of suffering, the Buddha, Dharma and Sangha would not be acceptable. 
(Nagarjuna, MMK 24:1) 
In response to this charge the Prasangika's rebuttal is as follows: The problem of 
nihilism does not apply to the Prasangika chiefly because of the identity of emptiness 
and dependent arising championed by the school. Emptiness is not a denial of things, all 
it implies is that things are dependently arisen and that they lack any essential causal 
power. All phenomena from the form to the Buddha himself (gzugs nas rnam mkhyen 
bar) are empty of essence and thus arise in dependence upon various causes and 
conditions, there is nothing that is not dependently arisen. Thus the notion of dependent 
arising will make sense only when emptiness makes sense. Hence the Prasangika 
Madhyamika reverse the charges by pointing out that if things are nonempty, the four 
noble truths, arising, cessation, etc would not be acceptable. This is on the ground that it 
is impossible for nonempty phenomenon to exist, since nondependently arisen 
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phenomena could not exist. "For those to whom emptiness makes sense, everything 
makes sense. For those to whom emptiness does not make sense, nothing makes sense." 
(MMK 24: 14) (Nagarjuna, 2006: 501) Emptiness makes sense only when the dependent 
arising makes sense similarly dependent arising will make sense only when emptiness 
does. This is because emptiness and dependent arising are identical as Garfield explains: 
Nagarjuna asserts that the dependently arisen is emptiness. Emptiness 
and the phenomenal world are not two distinct things, but rather two 
characterizations of the same thing. To say of something that it is 
dependently co-arisen is to say that it is empty. To say of something 
that is empty is another way of saying that it arises dependently. (2002: 
36) 
Because of the reasons discussed above, the Prasangika recognises dependent arising / 
emptiness as the middle way. The middle way that is free from the two extremes — the 
extreme of reificationism and the extreme of nihilism. By rejecting essence and by way 
of demonstrating that things are dependently arisen, and therefore empty, the Prdsangika 
is able to steer clear of the clutches of both these extremes. 
5. Other Proofs of Dependent Arising and Emptiness 
Madhyamaka philosophy uses various proofs (Tib. gtan tshigs) to demonstrate that 
things are dependently arisen. Sri Dipariikara Thana (also known Atiga 982-1054 C.E.) 
offers five proofs in his Bodhipathapradipa (Tib. Byang chub lam gyi sgron ma, Eng. A 
Lamp for the Path of Enlightenment): 
First, the "diamond-particle proof' (Skt. vajrakanahetu, Tib. rdo rje gzegs ma 
gtan tshigs) demonstrates the emptinesss of essence by means of refuting the arising 
from the four extremes — arising from self, another, both and neither. Hence in Atiga's 
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words this proof is stated as: "Things have no intrinsic nature because they do not arise 
from themselves, nor from another, nor from both nor are they yet without cause" (v.49) 
(2000: 232) Nagarjuna in fact opens his magnum opus, MCdamadhyamakarika with this 
claim — "Neither from itself nor from another, nor from both, nor without cause, does 
anything anywhere, ever arise." (MMK 1.1) Where as if things are unconditioned 
causally, according to this argument, they must arise from either one of these four 
alternatives. In other words, if things have essences one of these four must apply. 
However, as Chapter 1 has shown things do not arise from the self, as Chapter 2 has 
shown things do not arise from another (other then themselves), as Chapter 3 has shown 
things do not arise from both self and another, nor do they arise causelessly. Therefore, 
things do not arise from essence, it follows therefore things are dependently arisen. 
Second, the proof that refutes the arising of existent and non-existent things (Skt. 
sadasadutpeidapratisedhahetu, Tib. yod med skye gog gi gtan tshigs) states that "An 
existent's arising is untenable. A nonexistent's is like a flower in the sky. Nor do both 
[existent and nonexistent] arise together for both [said] fallacies apply." (v.48) (Atiga, 
2000: 230) In this proof Atiga shows that all phenomena lack essence, thus are 
dependently arisen by refuting the four metaphysical extremes. Whatever phenomena 
that exist cannot arise as it already exists and its rearising would be redundant; a 
phenomenon that does not exist will not arise since it is nonexistent like the sky flower. 
Just as the sky flower does not have causal power to arise itself, so is the case with a 
nonexistent phenomenon; nor can that which is both existent and nonexistent arise since 
the same logical fallacies shown to them individually would apply. Moreover, as 
Santideva argues in his Bodhiceirytivatara, "What would be the purpose of causes for a 
thing that already exists? If however a thing does not exist what would be the need of 
causes again." (6.145) This follows since even a hundred billion causes will not produce 
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any change in something which does not exist. (6.146) (antideva, 1995: 130) 
Similarly, if nonexistence is not gone away there can be no chance for the existing 
thing. (v.6.147) (antideva, 1995: 130) 
Third proof demonstrates the emptiness of essence by means of the four modes of 
being (Skt. catuskovutpadapratisedhahetu, Tib. mu bzhi skye gog gi gtan tshigs). The 
argument states that things are empty of essence because their essence is neither found 
in existence / being nor in nonexistence / nonbeing nor both existence-nonexistence / 
being-nonbeing nor neither. The first two premises are already shown to be true in the 
second proof. Third premise is also true because if essence is refuted in thing's 
existence and nonexistence, it must be refuted in the case of the combination of both 
(existence-nonexistence) since the third alternative follows from the first two. The 
fourth premise also makes sense because for the Prasangika if things do have essence it 
must be found either in existence or nonexistence or both and that it cannot be otherwise 
— i.e., it cannot be the case of neither existence or nonexistence. What this argument 
points to is this. If things do have any essence, intrinsic existence, for the Prasatigika it 
must be found at least from one of the four possible modes of being. Since essence is 
not found in any one of them, the conclusion is that things must be empty of essence, 
thus dependently arisen. 
Fourth, the "dependent arising proof' (Skt. pratityasamutpadahetu, Tib. rten 'brel 
gyi gtan tshigs) as I will demonstrate in Chapter 5, shows that things are produced from 
the collaboration of multiple causes and condition thereby ruling out any inherent 
existence of things. This is the proof employed in the majority of Madhyamaka texts 
and is said to be the most effective proof to combat reificationism, or essentialism, to 
prove things as metaphysically empty thus causally interdependent — hence the name 
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"the king of reasonings" (rigs pa'i rgyal po). (I will devote the whole Chapter 5 to 
showing why this is the case.) 
Fifth, the "empty of being one and many proof / identity and plurality proof' (Skt. 
ekanekaviyogahetu, Tib. gcig du bral gyi gtan tshigs) proves all phenomena are empty 
of essence because they all lack the characteristics of being essentially one or essentially 
many — "Furthermore, if one analyses all things as identities or multiplicities, intrinsic 
existence is not perceived; hence it is certain that their inherent existence does not 
exist." (v.50) (Atiga, 2000: 233) According to this proof my laptop, for example, is 
dependently arisen because it utterly lacks essence. Conventionally the laptop appears to 
my conceptual cognition as a discrete and independent whole existing from its own 
right. This argument however tells me to have a much closer look at the ontological 
status of the laptop. It points out that on a closer and more critical inspection the laptop, 
while presenting itself as if its final objective ontological status is a real computer is 
purely constituted by many different parts of which none is "computer." The laptop is 
neither (1) identical with parts nor (2) separate from the parts. If it is (1) there would be 
many laptops since they are many parts of my laptop. Conversely my laptop would have 
only a single part since I have only one computer. Both absurd consequences would 
follow if the laptop and its parts are essentially identical. If it is (2) the laptop and its 
parts would exist independently of each other. Thus there would be a whole laptop 
without its parts and parts of computer without its whole. If this is granted the existence 
of my laptop would not depend on its parts. I could literally throw away all the parts, 
and still I would have my computer intact. Absurdities such as these would follow if 
parts and whole are granted distinct ontological status. The laptop is (3) neither 
essentially dependent on its parts (4) nor are its part essentially dependent on the whole 
computer. Both premises (3) and (4) follow because their denial presupposes the 
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essentially distinct existence of the computer and its parts, which is already shown 
untenable and logically absurd. (5) It is also not the case that the computer possesses its 
parts; (6) nor is it the case that the parts possess the computer. Both premises follow on 
the ground that the computer and its parts are not spatially separable. Whereas if (5) 
and (6) are not true than it must be the case the computer and its parts are distinct since 
both their counter positives presuppose their distinctness. It is also not the case that a 
computer is (7) a mere collection of its parts (8) nor is it the case that the shape of its 
parts makes the computer. If premise (7) is false then I should be able to break my 
computer into pieces, pile the pieces together and I would still have a really functional 
computer. That would be absurd. If premise (8) is false then I would have many 
computers since my only computer has many parts and each part has different shapes. 
Conversely all the parts of my computer would have only one shape since there is only 
one computer. Therefore it is clear that the laptop is neither essentially one as it is 
constituted with many parts nor is it essentially many since there is only one computer. 
Hence the laptop is empty of essence and is merely dependently arisen. 
According to the Prasatigika Madhyamika if my computer has any essential 
existence its essence must withstand such logical analyses, and reveal its singular 
identity or multiple identities. The failure to stand up to the critical investigation means 
its existence is conceptually designated in dependence upon its parts, without any 
essence whatsoever. Candrakirti, through the example of a chariot, summarises the 
thrust of this argument as follows: "One does not consider a carriage to be different 
from its own parts, nor to be identical, nor to be in possession of them, nor is it 'in' the 
parts, nor are they 'in' it, nor is it the mere composite [of its parts]; nor is it the shape 
[of those parts." (MA 6.151) (Candrakirti, 1999: 269) 
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6. Conclusion 
So, what is the implication of the Prasatigika Madhyamika's categorical refutation of all 
four alternatives of the reificationist causal theories? Does it imply that this school does 
not propose any positive causal thesis? There are at least three possible ways of 
answering these questions: First, it could be answered that the Prasangika Madhyamika 
school does not positively propose any causal thesis because advancing any causal 
account must belong to view that asserts either the arising from self, or arising from 
another or arising from both or arising from neither (i.e., causeless). Since the 
Prasatigika rejects all these four causal theses charging that these accounts presuppose 
the arising through the power of essence, it does not have any causal thesis. I have 
however shown that this view is not consistent with the Prasatigika's position. It asserts 
that the Prasatigika Madhyamika denies any causal thesis on the account of its rejection 
of the four essentialist causal theses. I have shown in this chapter that this conclusion is 
false. That the Prasangika does have a causal thesis of dependent arising that explains 
the relationship between cause and effect but it does not ential essentialism. The 
Prasangika even employs five great proofs to establish the dependently arisen nature of 
things. So the crucial point is that Prasangika rejects the four alternatives understood as 
essentialist positions. By pointing out that all four positions presuppose essentialism, 
Prasangika makes space for another theory of causation that is not essentialist. 
The second possible response would be to say that since everything is ultimately 
empty, causality must be also ultimately empty. Therefore the Prasangika Madhyamika 
does not hold any position regarding causality. It denies the causal thesis for the 
Prasangika Madhyamika on the ground of ultimate truth. I have also indicated in this 
chapter that this response is also problematic. This fails to provide an explanation of the 
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empirical / conventional nature of things, and fails to explain the causal connection 
between the sprout and the seed in the Prasangika Madhyamika's view. I have argued 
that the Prasangika philosophy is committed to stand by the claim that things are 
dependently arisen conventionally even though they might be ultimately empty and that 
the causal connection can be explained on the basis of the theory of dependent arising. I 
will save this explanation for the final chapter. 
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Chapter 5 
Theory of Dependent Arising -II 
1. Introduction 
As we have witnessed in the previous chapters, the Prasatigika Madhyamika school, by 
citing the following first verse of the Mulamadhyamakarikii of Nagarjuna — 
Neither from itself nor from another 
Nor from both, 
Nor without a cause 
Does anything anywhere, ever arise (MMK 1.1)45 
refutes the four alternative modes of causation — the arising from self, the arising from 
another, the arising from both self and another, and the arising without cause — on the 
grounds of the Prasatigika Madhyamika's denial of essential arising. According to this 
school one is forced to accept one of the four alternative forms of arising as long as one 
is committed to the causal view that maintains the arising through the power of inherent 
existence, or essence. This follows for the Prasatigika because, they argue: "It is 
absolutely certain that arising either has a cause or does not. If there is a cause, it is also 
absolutely certain that there are three alternatives: the cause and the effect have to have 
either the same essence or different essences or both." (Tsonglchapa, 2006: 49) This 
makse sense given it is not acceptable for the Prasatigika to either accept the cause and 
effect as essentially identical, or essentially distinct or essentially both identical and 
distinct. This also follows because, as shown in previous chapters and will be 
demonstrated here in this chapter, the Prasatigika Madhyamika school categorically 
45 This is the introductory verse of his chapter on Examination of Conditions. Translation of the verse is 
used from Prof. Jay Garfield's The Fundamental Wisdom of the Middle Way. 
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rejects essence on all counts, much less causal essence. Therefore, the refutation of the 
four causal theses is sufficient to refute causal accounts based on the conception of 
essence. 
The Prasangika Madhyamika on the other hand proposes dependent arising as the 
preferred and alternative causal account. For the Prasangika Madhyamika dependent 
arising is more than just a causal account, it is the cornerstone of the Prasangika's 
metaphysics, epistemology, ethics and soteriology. Dependent arising is, as Nagarjuna 
points out in his Mfilamadhyamakakarika . 
That which is dependently arisen 
Is explained to be emptiness. 
That, being a dependent designation, 
Is itself the middle way. (24: 18) 
It is the key to the perspective of the middle path — beyond the metaphysical extremes of 
nihilism and eternalism, the ethical extremes of relativism and fundamentalism, the 
epistemological extremes of realism and idealism. Dependent arising constitutes the 
objective content of enlightened wisdom. It provides the conceptual framework within 
which all Buddhist doctrines and disciplines — among others, the four noble truths, 
eightfold path, the two truths, no-self, emptiness, compassion, and loving kindness — are 
explained. It is central to the realization of the two truths — the way things really are 
ultimately and the way things exist conventionally. 
The Prasangika Madhyamika goes as far as equating the penetration into 
dependent arising with the unique discovery of the Buddha's enlightenment. So crucial 
is this principle to the Prasangika Madhyamika's doctrines that an insight into 
dependent arising is held to be sufficient to yield an understanding of the reality of all 
phenomena. In the words of the Buddha, "He who sees dependent arising sees the 
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Dhamma; he who sees the Dhamma sees dependent arising." (Cited in Nagarjuna, 2004: 
376) 
Dependent arising is the invariable natural law that governs the causal relation 
between the arising and ceasing of wholesome or unwholesome phenomena and the 
functional efficacy of causal conditions. The correct understanding of dependent arising, 
according to the Prasatigika Madhyamika, is an antidote against the roots of all ethical 
or causal problems — it eliminates delusions and reified views holding things to arise 
causelessly or from incompatible causes. It is central to the path to enlightenment since 
it is through an accurate understanding of the dependently arisen that the nature of 
cyclic existence comes to an end. 
Furthermore, all Indian and Tibetan Madhyamikas unanimously recognise 
dependent arising as "the king of all reasonings" (Skt. yukti raja, Tib. rigs pail rgyal po) 
on the ground of its efficiency in refuting the problematic causal theses, advancing the 
Madhyamika's own causal account, and rebutting the charges against this account. And 
most importantly of all, it is a plausible alternative answer to the unsolved metaphysical 
question of causation. Appraising this theory Jayatilleke, for example, writes, "It is with 
Buddhism that we, for the first time, meet with a clear cut theory of causation in the 
history of Indian thought." (1963: 445). The Prasangika Madhyamika's theory of 
dependent arising undermines a strict determinist theory which holds that everything 
happens "due to what one did in the past," a theistic form of determinism which holds 
that everything is "due to the creation of God," and an indeterminism which holds that 
everything happens "without cause or reason." Therefore dependent arising is, as 
Kalupahana explains, "the middle path presented by the Buddha between the extremes 
of eternalism and annihilationism, of strict determinism and chaotic indeterminism, of 
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absolute reality and nihilistic unreality, of permanent identity and absolute 
indifference." (1991: 16) 
The principle of dependent arising is, for Prasarigika Madhyamika, applicable to 
any situation where an arising of phenomena takes place, be it physical or mental, 
spatial or temporal. But what does dependent arising mean? How does it explain the 
causal relations of the world? In Chapter 4 we have already considered a part of the 
Prasatigika's response to these questions by discussing the five great arguments / 
reasonings (Tib. gtan tshigs chen po nga) which sets the foundation to supporting the 
thesis of dependent arising. In this chapter however, I will first conduct an etymological 
analysis of the term and then introduce two more arguments — (1) the subjective and (2) 
the objective — to further explain and defend the principle of dependent arising as a 
plausible causal account for the Prasatigika Madhyamika. 
I will begin with a brief etymological analysis of the term pratityasamutpada: 
2. Etymological Analysis 
The term pratityasamutpada is, as noted in Wilson's Analysis and Meaning: An Inquiry 
into the Meaning of Buddha's View of "Pratityasamutpada" (2003) has many English 
versions — 'dependent Origination,' dependent arising,' dependent co-origination,' 
'conditioned genesis,' conditioned production,' conditioned co-production', 'mutual 
causality' and 'interdependent transformation.' All these English versions are variant 
translations of the original Sanskrit term pratTtya-samutpiida (Tib. rten cing 'brdel bar 
`byung ba). Pratitya-samutpada is the combination of two words: pratttya and 
samutpada and these two words are formed by a complex set of grammatical rules in 
Sanskrit. The formation of the word is not that significant to questions at issue here, so 
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to avoid the complications, I will not discuss all etymological details of the word. I will 
focus more upon the meaning behind the two combined words. 
The prefix prati in the word pratitya' (prati + i + tya), according to Candralcirti 
means 'meeting' and the verbal root i has the meaning of 'going'. But with the 
continuative ending tya modified by the prefix prati, prattlya refers to 'meeting' and 
'relying'. And in the term samutpada, the root pad preceded by the samut 'to arise; 
therefore samutpada refers to 'arising.' Hence, in Hopkins' words, pratrtya-samutpada 
means "the arising of things in reliance on causes and conditions." (1996: 664-665; 
2003: 852) Jayatilleke explains "prati as 'relying': prati+ -Vi+(t)ya (gerund) meaning 
'having come on account of.' (2004: 445) And the term samuppada "denotes the 
presence of a plurality of conditions and their occurrences together in bringing about the 
result. Samuppanna means when arising, it arises together, i.e. co-ordinately, not singly 
nor without a cause.' (Jayatilleke, 2004: 447)46 Elsewhere Buddhagosha defines 
paticca samuppada as "that according to which co-ordinate phenomena are produced 
mutually." (Macy, 1991: 34) Garfield defines the term as "the nexus between 
phenomena by virtue of which events depend on other events, composites depend upon 
their parts, and so on." (2002: 26) Also, pratitya means 'conditioned becoming' and 
sam in the word samutpada means sambandh 'relation' and utpada has the meaning of 
'arising.' For this reason the Tibetan etymologists explain rten cing 'brel bar `byung ba 
where the first word rten cing refers to 'depending,' bre/ bar means 'relation' and 
`byung ba' refers to 'arising.' 
The etymological analysis therefore reveals, in spite of variant uses of language 
and descriptive terminology, the implication of pratilya-samutpada is that all 
phenomena — internal and external — do not arise from any intrinsic nature (svabhava), 
46 Uppajjamano ca saha sama ca uppajjati na ekekato na pi ahetuto ti samuppanno 
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either of their own or of another, but arises from nexus between appropriate causes and 
conditions; and that there is a regularity in the arising of phenomena since they occur 
without any transitional disruption between the earlier causal moments and the later 
resultant moments. So to borrow Bodhi Bikkhu's words: "things are seen to arise, not 
from some intrinsic nature of their own, from necessity, chance or accident, but from 
their causal correlations with other things to which they are connected as part of the 
fixed order obtaining between phenomena." (1980: 5) 
3. The Argument for Objective Dependent Arising 
Traditionally dependent arising can be explained in two different ways: the objective 
(otherwise known as the 'external') dependent arising (Skt. bahya pratityasamutpada, 
Tib. phyi rten 'brel) and the subjective (otherwise known as the 'internal') dependent 
arising (Skt. adhyatmika pratayasamutpada, Tib. nang gi rten 'brel). The objective 
dependent arising pertains to the chain of causal processes or relations that take place in 
the arising and cessation of the world of external objects or events; whereas the 
subjective dependent arising consists of the chains of causal processes or relations 
taking place in the arising and cessation of the subjective world — mind and mental 
states. 
Now I will consider the argument of objective or external dependent arising. At 
the centre of this argument is the premise that all the external objects and events are 
causally and conditionally related and therefore they all are dependently arisen. The 
Prasangika Madhyamika defines the objective dependent arising — the conditioned 
arising of external phenomena — based on the following causal formula of the Buddha 
found in the Sarnyutta Nikaya: 
When this exists, that comes to be; 
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with the arising of this, that arises. 
When this does not exist, that does not come to be; 
with the cessation of this, that ceases. (Bodhi, 2000: 517) 47 
The Prasangika Madhyamika's causal thesis of objective dependent arising has this 
formula at its heart. Let us first understand this formula. The first line in the statement — 
When this exists, that comes to be; with the arising of this, that arises — signifies things' 
process of arising or becoming. Every thing owes, according to this formula, its origin 
in the existence of other things. Things arise and become what they are due to the 
collaboration of the existing causes and conditions (Skt. hetu / pratyaya, Tib. rgyu / 
rkyen). While causes and conditions collaboratively produce things, there is an 
important distinction to be made on the basis of how each contributes to the production 
process thus how each is related to the effect. The primary player in the process of 
production is cause, since it is that which transforms into the effect. In other words, the 
relationship between cause and effect is such that the continuum of cause becomes the 
effect whereas the way in which conditions relate to the effect is such that the continua 
do not become the effect, rather all cooperative or supporting conditions. And deficient 
of any one of the co-operative conditions would obstruct the production of the effect. 
Thus both causes and conditions are equally critical to the arising of effect, each of 
which has a different relation to the effect. 
Let us first have a closer look at the causal relation followed by the conditional 
relation in objective dependent origination. In the Scalistamba-satra, Nagarjuna explains 
the causal process with this example: "What, then, is the causal relation in objective 
conditioned arising? It is as when a sprout comes from a seed, from the sprout a leaf, 
47 Imasmim sail idam hoti, imass, uppada idatp uppajjati. Imasmim asati idam na hoti, imassa nirodha 
idanz nirujjhati. (Jayatilleke, 2004 : 449) 
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from the leaf a shoot, from the shoot a stalk, from the stalk a bud, from the bud a flower, 
and from the flower a fruit." (1998: 35) 
This statement also reveals that the fundamental reality of all things is objective, 
not a subjective category conceptually imposed upon things, since all of them are 
objectively causally conditioned. The S'alistamba-satra illustrates the objective 
creativity of things as follows: "When there is a seed, the development of a sprout 
occurs, and so on until: when there is a flower, the development of a fruit occurs. It does 
not occur to the seed, 'I cause the sprout to develop.' Nor does it occur to the sprout, 'I 
am developed by the seed', and so on until: it does not occur to the flower, 'I cause the 
fruit to develop.' Nor does it occur to the fruit, 'I am developed by the flower.' 
(Nagarjuna, 1998: 35) And therefore true knowledge of how things really are constitutes 
in knowing what exists as 'existing' what does not exists as 'not existing.' 
This means the creative matrix which continually generates and regenerate the 
existence of things, according to this causal formula, occur within the range of things 
themselves and other associated supporting conditions, without resorting to some 
external supernatural creative force or agency. As Jim Wilson correctly explains it "this 
is not only a theory of how things come into existence" it also "points to things as the 
locus of creativity in existence; though, because this applies to all things, this locus has 
no specific location but, rather, constitutes an aspect of the nature of all existing 
things."(2003: 7) And these existing things themselves act as a "transformer, receiving 
the beneficence of support from many other things, taking that energy, matter, form etc., 
and then transforming what it has received into potentialities for other things, allowing 
for the birth of other things." (2003: 7) 
Despite the critical role played by the cause (seed, sprout, leaf, and etc) in 
objective dependent arising, elemental factors or conditional factors are equally 
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significant for the production of the effect. The ,alistamba-scitra recognises six 
elemental factors: earth, water, heat, wind, space and seasonal" factors. This implies 
that the cause is constituted by manifold conditions, each of which has a different 
relationship to the effect and is, therefore, a different type of condition. The earth 
element functions to support the seed, the water element moistens the seed, the heat 
element matures it, the wind element brings out the seed, the space element allows the 
functions by way of not posing any obstruction and the seasonal element functions to 
transform the seed. When all these necessary conditions come together, neither 
excessively nor deficiently, then there occurs a production of the effect. 
Just as the cause work objectively, so do the conditions. It does not occur to any 
of these conditions that "I am" responsible for causing the sprout to germinate, nor does 
it occur to the seed that with the coming together of these six conditions "I" produce the 
sprout. Nevertheless, merely coming together of these conditions is not sufficient to 
producing the effect since the conditions must have balance, and a harmonious and 
appropriate combination in order to produce the effect. (Nagarjuna, 2004: 382-84) 
Therefore Nagarjuna powerfully sums up the points as follows: 
This sprout is not self-caused, not caused by another, not caused by 
both, not caused by God, not transformed by an absolute time, not 
derived from prakrti, not founded upon a single principle, yet not 
arisen without cause. From the coming together of the earth, water, 
heat, wind, space and season factors, when the seed is ceasing the 
development of the sprout occurs. Thus is the conditional relation in 
objective conditioned arising to be seen. (1998: 38) 49 
48 Seasonal factor here refers to temporal factor (s) (dus kyi khams). 
49 Sa cayam-atikuro na svayaritkrto na parakrto nobhayakrto navaranirmito na kalaparirtamito na 
prakrtisaMbhuto (na caikakara0dhino) napyahetusamutpannalt/ 
prthivyaptejovayveiketlartudhatusamavayat, bije nirudhyamane 'fikurasyabhinirvrttir-bhavatil evarit 
bahyasya pratityasamutpadasya pratyayopanibandho dragavyaW 
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The kilistamba-sutra also explains the objective dependent arising with the help of 
five principles (Nagarjuna, 2004: 170, Ibid, 1998:40) 
First, the principle of non -permanence (Tib. rtag pa ma yin pa) implies that 
whatever is dependently arisen phenomena, i.e., causally conditioned must not be 
permanent. What this means is that the law of cause-effect applies only to 
impermanent phenomena. This follows because while effect arises from cause, 
nevertheless cause is different from its effect and effect is different from its cause. 
Yet the effect (the sprout) is neither produced without the termination of its cause 
(the seed), nor with the termination of its cause, thus a permanent persistence of the 
cause is ruled out. But the fact that cause (the seed) ceases and effect (the sprout) 
emerges is because an impermanent cause is at work. 
Second, the principle of non -annihilation (Tib. chad par min pa) means that cause 
is not annihilated in the process of production of its effect. This follows since that the 
cessation of cause (seed) prior to the production of effect does not bring forth the effect 
(sprout) nor does an effect emerge when the cause remains unceased. Nevertheless, 
when the cause ceases the sprout emerges, thus proving that the cause is not annihilated. 
Third, the principle of non -transmigration (Tib.pho bar ma yin) essentially 
explains that in the causal process the cause is itself not entirely transmigrated to form 
the effect. If it were, there should be no reason for the cause and its effect not to be 
identical. 
Fourth, the principle which states that 'a tiny seed develops into a manifold effect' 
(Tib. rgyu chung las Vras bu chen pc. 'grub) explains an enormous potentiality of the 
cause. As it is empirically evident sowing a tiny seed can bring forth a gigantic tree with 
thousands of fruits. 
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Finally, the principle of causal contiguity (Tib. Vra ba'i rjes su 'clro ba) confirms 
a contiguous relationship between the cause and its effect such that only a very specific 
effect arises from a very specific cause — if an apple seed is planted, only apple fruits 
arise. Moreover the quality and quantity of apple yields depend upon the whether or not 
the apple seed is nurtured properly. This principle also confirms that when there is no 
causal contiguity, there is no production of the effect — when an apple seed is planted, 
bananas are not produced at all and vice versa. 
Let me now turn to the second line in the statement: 
When this does not exist, that does not come to be; 
with the cessation of this, that ceases. (Bodhi, 2000: 517) 
This explains the causal process in the cessation of phenomena. Just as things arise due 
to a nexus of necessary causes and conditions, so also, they decline, decay and 
eventually cease to exist due to a nexus of necessary causes and conditions. Again in the 
galistamba-sCitra, Nagarjuna illustrates the point as follows: When there is seed, a 
sprout does not occur, when there is no sprout a leaf does not occur, when there is no 
leaf, a shoot does not occur, when there is no shoot, a stalk does not occur, when there is 
no stalk, a bud does not occur, when there is no bud, a flower does not occur, and when 
there is no flower, a fruit does not occur. (1998: 35) Therefore flower ceases when bud 
ceases, bud ceases when stalk ceases, stalk ceases when shoot ceases, shoot ceases when 
leave ceases, leave cease sprout ceases and sprout cease when seed ceases. 
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4. The Argument for Subjective Dependent Arising 
Let us take the argument of subjective dependent arising second. Again the same 
formula is applied for this causal argument: 
When this exists, that comes to be; 
With the arising of this, that arises. 
When this does not exist, that does not come to be; 
With the cessation of this, that ceases. (Bodhi, 2000: 517) 
This formula when applied to subjective dependent arising, explains the chain of causal 
processes operating in the mind (and mental states). To put it in a traditional context, the 
subjective dependent arising explains the causal law pertaining to the human conditions 
in the sarnsaric world since it explains the causal chain involved in the four noble 
truths: suffering, the process of origin of suffering, freedom from suffering and the path 
to freedom from suffering. The causal chain operating in the four noble truths can be 
understood with the twelve factors of dependent arising. 
All twelve factors, as our analysis will reveal, are defined by the existence of the 
one causal chain formed by the nexus of interrelated transient processes, each producing 
the next event. Each link is conditioned by the preceding one, and itself conditions the 
succeeding one. There are two ways in which this causal chain can be analysed: (1) the 
forward procreativity process (Tib. lug hyung) and (2) the backward reversal process 
(Tib. lug ldog). The former explains the way in which each link proactively participates 
in the production of the succeeding events, leading eventually to another spin of the 
wheel of samsara. The latter explains the reversal process — the way in which each link 
in the causal process can be brought to an end by severing of the prior conditioning link, 
replacing ignorance with wisdom which puts an end to the suffering and rebirth process. 
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To understand the first process — what these causal links are, and how each link 
contributes to the causal chain proactively — we will need to turn to the Buddha's 
formula once again: 
When this exists, that comes to be; 
With the arising of this, that arises. 
This formula explains the way in which each link proactively participates in the causal 
process where each link becomes an effect due to the conditioning of the former links 
and each link in turn conditions the latter links that follow. The links in the causal chain 
are put together as follows: 
1) With delusion (avidya / marig pa) as condition, 
2) volitional activity / karma-formations (sarizskara / 'du byed) arises; with the karma 
formation as condition, 
3) consciousness (vifriana / rnam shes) arises; with consciousness as condition, 
4) name-form (nama rupa / ming gzhugs) arises; with name-form as condition, 
5) senses (sadayatana / skyed byed) arises, with sense as condition, 
6) contact (sparfa / reg pa) arises; with contact as condition, 
7) feeling (vedana / tshor ba) arises; with feeling as condition, 
8) craving (trst:Ca /sredpa) arises; with craving as condition, 
9) appropriation / grasping (upadana / len pa) arises; with appropriation as condition, 
10) existence / becoming (bhava / srid pa) arises; with existence as condition, 
11) birth (jãti / skyes pa) arises; and with birth as condition, 
(12) old age and death (/ara-marana/rga shis) lamentation, suffering, displeasure and 
anxiety come to be. 
So with the existence of the preceding links, succeeding links occur and the 
succeeding links in turn give rise to the following links and thus keep the samsaric cycle 
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alive. Ignorance (avidya / marig pa) is the first link. The type of ignorance in question is 
a very specific one that satisfies three characteristics. First, ignorance does not simply 
mean an absence of knowledge in the general sense. For example an ignorance of 2 + 2 
= 4, while it is a form of ignorance, it is indeed not the type of ignorance in which the 
Madhyamikas are interested. For it is causally irrelevant in the formation of karmic 
process conditioning the samsaric link given that the knowledge of solution to this 
simple equation will have no impact whatsoever in severing the causal sanisaric 
suffering. Second, ignorance is not just other than wisdom. While craving, aversion etc 
are other than wisdom and although each is conditioned by ignorance, each of them are 
not ignorance. Third, the ignorance at issue is rather one that is a diametrical opposite of 
wisdom that sees reality of things as they really are — one that proactively reifies the 
reality of things thus acting as the root of all defilements. As Nagarjuna explains it in 
his S'anyatasaptati: "To conceive things arisen through causes and conditions as real is 
what the teacher calls 'ignorance.' From that the twelve links arise." (Nagajuna, 1986: 
114) 
Ignorance fundamentally distorts the reality of phenomena and persons and 
erroneously grasps them as having inherently real self and unitary identities. 
Conditioned by ignorance are volitional activities (sarhskara / 'du byed) carried out 
through body, speech and mind under the influence of attachment, aversion and 
confusion towards the pleasant, unpleasant and neutral sensory experiences 
respectively. These volitional activities be they wholesome, unwholesome or ethically 
neutral are nevertheless directly rooted in ignorance and sustained by craving, desires, 
will, ill-will, animosity, anger, jealousy and so forth, thus karmically conditioning 
consciousness (vijilana / rnam shes). With the relinking-consciousness as condition, the 
four name aggregates (nama / ming) — sensation, perception), compounded phenomena 
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and consciousness — and the form aggregates (rftpa / gzhugs) — physical body — occur. 
And with the name-form aggregates as condition, the six sense-bases NO yatana / 
skyed byed) — the eyes, the ears, the nose, the tongue, the body — and the introspective 
sense gradually develops during the embryonic stages. All these senses do not operated 
under the influence of any external agent or prime mover they each have their own 
respective objective domains (gzung yul) and subjective functions. When sense faculties 
collide with their respective sense objects, they give rise to six consciousnesses. With 
the collision of the eye faculty and visual object, the visual consciousness arises. The 
assemblage of these three namely sense faculty, sense object and consciousness 
conditions contact (spars'a / reg pa). Conditioned by contact between senses, objects 
and consciousnesses, the next link, feelings (vedand / tshor ba) arises in the experiential 
domain which is either pleasant, or unpleasant or neutral. Feeling conditions craving 
(trytta/sred pa) since the latter arises due to reaction against sensations — reaction to the 
pleasant experience generates attachment, unpleasant sensation generates aversion and 
neutral sensation generates confusion. As Tsongkhapa puts it, "The craver craves the 
pleasant in order not to be away from it, he craves being away from suffering, and he 
craves the nondiminution of the neutral." (2006: 538) Craving conditions clinging 
(upadana / len pa) since the latter is the appropriation of the former. Craving and 
clinging can be differentiated wherein the former "is like groping in the dark to steal an 
object" and the later "corresponds to the actual stealing of the object." (Narada, 1988: 
428) So clinging is intensified craving as well as confusion giving rise to the notion of 
this and that being 'I' and 'mine' and what follows is the false grasping of self and 
phenomena. Dependant on clinging, arises becoming or existence (bhava / srid pa). 
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Conditioned by becoming, birth arises (/ãn). And birth is inevitably stalked by old age 
and death (/ara-maratja/rga shis). 5° 
Let me now turn to the second line in the statement: 
When this does not exist, that does not come to be; 
With the cessation of this, that ceases. 
This explains the reversal process (Tib. lug ldog) of the entire twelve causal links 
which has its beginning with the cessation of ignorance. Ignorance is eliminated 
through the wisdom of emptiness that directly knows both subjective and objective 
domains of person and phenomena as empty utterly lacking an inherent existence and 
that they are products of causally interdependent factors. With the cessation of 
ignorance volitional activity / karma-formations also cease since conditioning factors of 
volitional formations such as craving, aversion and confusion born out from ignorance 
no longer hold sway over the cognitive states. Thus no physical, vocal, and mental 
action is performed under the influence of ignorance of neutral feelings, attachment to 
pleasant feelings, and aversion to unpleasant feelings. The cessation of karmic 
formation leads to the cessation of the consciousness driven by karmic seeds. This is 
because once all karmas including its latencies are burnt out through the force of 
wisdom, consciousness is no longer supported or fueled by reactive emotions or 
thoughts. With the cessation of consciousness name-form ceases. Name-form which 
constitutes an elementary structure of our physical and mental aggregates are all lifeless 
and would not flourish without the presence of their life enriching consciousness. Thus 
50 With these twelve conditions conditioning the succeeding links cover three phases of all sentient 
beings: The first two — delusion and volitional activities — occur in the former events. Delusion conditions 
the volitional activities producing karmic formations which trigger new life through conditioning the 
relinking consciousness. The next seven links — relinking consciousness, name-form, senses, contact, 
feeling, craving, and appropriation — occur in the current phase. The last three links — becoming, birth and 
old age-death — occur in the future phase. 
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ceases name-form leading to the cessation of the six sense faculties. This follows 
because sense faculties cannot attain their maturity and operate unless name-form is 
present. With the cessation of six senses their contacts with sensory objects also ceases. 
For contact to arise there has to be a transaction between the objective and a subjective 
domain, sensory contact does not arise merely from the presence of an object without its 
subjective domain. With the cessation of contact between the sensory objects and sense-
faculties also ceases feeling. This follows because pleasant feelings do not arise unless 
there is a sensory contact with pleasant objects, unpleasant feelings do not arise unless 
there is a sensory contact with unpleasant objects. Likewise there is no indifferent 
feeling unless there is a sensory contact with the neither pleasant nor unpleasant objects. 
With the cessation of feeling also ceases craving. Psychological / cognitive reactions 
fueled by ignorance towards feelings — craving with the pleasant feeling, aversion with 
the unpleasant, and indifference with the neutral feelings — ceases with the cessation of 
feelings. The cessation of the craving leads to the cessation of appropriation / clinging / 
grasping. This follows because without craving with its underlying ignorance there will 
be no conditioning of the mind to the extend that various feelings and sensory objects 
are appropriated as 'Mine' belonging to 'Me' and the five aggregates (form, feeling, 
perception, volitional formations, consciousness) are appropriated or identified as 'I', 
'Me' thus generating clinging or grasping to view of self and identity. With the 
cessation of appropriation / clinging / grasping also ceases existence / becoming. This is 
so because without being conditioned by the appropriation of the five aggregates as self 
there will be no existence / becoming with in various existential realms. The cessation 
of the becoming leads to the cessation of birth. With the cessation of birth also ceases 
old age, death, lamentation, suffering, displeasure and anxiety. Thus release is attained 
from the whole mass of suffering. 
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Despite the critical role each link plays in spinning the causal chain of the 
subjective dependent arising, it is crucial to note that the six elemental factors (dhatus) 
are equally significant in conditioning the production of this causal chain. In the 
S'alistamba -sutra Nagarjuna adds the contributions made to the chain of subjective 
dependent arising through six elemental factors - earth, water, heat, wind, space and 
consciousness factors. 
The function of the earth element in the subjective dependent arising is to 
conglomerate the solid nature of the body to develop, the water element carries out 
cohesion-function of the body, the heat element functions to digest foods and drinks 
consumed by the body, the wind element allows inhalation and exhalation processes, the 
space element is responsible for the porous nature of organs and body and the 
consciousness factor causes to mature the name-form such that the physical and mental 
aggregates associated with the five sensory consciousnesses evolves along with the 
arising of defilements. So without these elemental conditions, even with each link 
playing its own causal role, the arising of the body does not occur. When all these 
causes and conditions come together, neither excessively nor deficiently, then there 
occurs the body. (Nagarjuna, 2004: 388-89) This implies that each link is constituted by 
manifold conditions, each of which has a different causal role to play that nevertheless 
collaboratively conditions the subsequent links as effects. Moreover, merely coming 
together of these conditions is not sufficient to produce the effect since the conditions 
must have balance, harmonious and appropriate relationship in order to produce the 
effect. (Nagarjuna, 2004: 389-90) 
The causal chain of twelve links is expressed as subjective dependent arising 
principally to highlight mental — psychological, cognitive, and ethical — contents of 
causation. Subjective dependent arising, the Madhyamika insists, must not imply that 
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this causal chain somehow operates on the basis of one's subjective whims. On the 
contrary, Madhyamika argues, subjective dependent arising operates entirely 
objectively, and naturally. It does not occur to any of the conditions or links involved 
that "I am" this, "I am" that, "I am" responsible for causing the subsequent factors nor 
does it occur to the subsequent factors that with the coming together of these six 
conditions "I" am produced. Therefore Nagarjuna sums up the points as follows: 
All these six conditional factors are "not self, not being, not a soul, not 
a creature, not human, not a person, not female, not male, not neuter, 
not 'I' not 'mine' and not any other's." (1998: 49) 
Although it is apparent that the former links become causes and the later links become 
effects, the Madhyamika argues this causal process involved in the subjective dependent 
arising does not entail the fallacy of Satilkhya's causal theory as interpreters such as 
Whalen Lai charges it of According to Lai, "It may then be said that there is a cause in 
the effect, and an effect in the cause. Strictly speaking, the satkaryavada position 
(effects preexist in causes) usually is denied by Buddhism, although it does come into 
its fold." (Lai, 1977: 248) I argue that Lai's charges are groundless for several reasons. 
First dependent arising as a causal account is fundamentally at odds with the Sarnkhya's 
view because while the former categorically rejects causal power of prakrti (primordial 
material essence) the latter believes that it is the causal power that enables the 
production of effect. Second, while the Sarnkhya argues that effect must preexist in the 
cause and that the role of cause is to bring an utunanifest effect into manifestation, the 
Madhyamika, on the other hand, argues that effect must not exist in the cause — if it did 
the cause and effect would exist simultaneously. In which case the function of cause 
becomes redundant for the effect would already exist. Third, the fallacy of the 
preexistence of the effect in the cause would not occur on the Madhyamika account 
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because the former links, ignorance for example, conditions volitional action as effect. 
In fact it is not just ignorance that does the conditioning, ignorance reinforced by 
underlying craving and appropriations are all responsible for conditioning volitional 
actions. Hence the later links do not exist either manifestly or unmanifestly during the 
former links. Only when the appropriate conditionings of former links come together as 
causal factors do the latter links follow as the effects. 
The Madhyamika maintain that there is neither a beginning nor an end to sarpara. 
There are several reasons for this claim: First the causal chain which perpetuates 
uncontrolled rebirth is circular, every stage is a cause when viewed from its effect, 
while it is also an effect of an antecedent cause. Second, none of these twelve links 
operate independently as each is conditioned by the other links. Although ignorance is 
tentatively recognized as the first of twelve links, it is indeed not the first cause. 
Ignorance itself is conditioned by various other epistemic, psychological, cognitive and 
ethical factors among which craving, aversion, and appropriation play dominant role in 
fuelling ignorance which actively reifies truths of person and phenomena as having 
discrete and inherent substance. Third, moreover dependent arising means production 
of dependently arisen phenomena from causal conditions that utterly lack any inherent 
existence and that inherent existence is necessary condition for sustaining the theory of 
the first cause. Thus the internal dependent arising not only explains the material causal 
processes but also explains our epistemic, psychological, cognitive, immoral / moral 
causal processes involved in mental life. And it is through this causal explanation, the 
Madhyamika argues, can one avoid both the extremes — annihilationism and eternalism 
— hence preserve the middle path principle. 
Page 116 of 125 
5. Conclusion 
In this chapter we saw the Prasangika's two primary arguments for the thesis of 
dependent arising — the subjective and the objective. The former explains the causal 
principle that underpins the arising of mental phenomena such as karmic volitional 
forces from ignorance, while the latter offers the causal explanation for the arising of 
the external phenomena such as the production of sprouts from their seeds. Central to 
both the arguments is the notion that everything — both the objective and the subjective 
worlds — is empty of any essence. Therefore, through the dual arguments the Prasatigika 
establishes that things become what they are through the force of causal 
interdependence. Thus while all phenomena are empty of any essence whatsoever, 
according to this school, they do nonetheless have their ontological status brought about 
by the network of causes and conditions. 
It is also argued that even the so-called subjective dependent arising is objective in 
the way it functions. Ignorance conditions objectively and interdependently without it 
relying upon any external subjective creative intervention of God — hence echoing the 
Buddha points when he says: "whether or not Tathagata arises, the true nature or the 
reality of dharma will constantly exist." (Nagarjuna, 2004: 380) 51 And this constant 
existence is marked by the process of arising and ceasing, is not projected by our 
conceptual thought but it is the reality of the dharmas themselves. From this analysis it 
is also clear that for the Prasatigika Madhyamika dependent arising is not an arbitary 
and contigent law of the subjective relativism, yet dependent arising is invariable truth 
marked by the principle of conditionality. There is nothing that transcends these marks 
51 
NcN.sccr.c.x.i.qcs.c-i gkcl."5.,-tc.ktrnN.q.aii 
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of dependent arising, hence nothing has ultimate truth other than it being dependently 
arisen. 
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Final Conclusion 
So, does the Prasatigika Madhyamika succeed in proving the causal thesis that things 
are dependently arisen and that they are empty of any essential causation? In my view 
the Prasangika's case for its thesis is definitely well founded. In this thesis, I have 
presented the Prasangika's arguments following Nagarjuna's approach. In Chapter 1, by 
means of refuting the Sainkhya's causal theory — the arising of things from the 
unconscious primordial material Prakrti and by showing the logical absurdities by 
means of the Prasangika's critique of the theory, I have demonstrated that things cannot 
arise from themselves, thus the arising from self is rejected. By rejecting the self 
causation the Prasatigika also rules out the possibility of the effect arising from the 
cause which is identical to its effect on the ground that the effect and the cause would be 
simultaneous. It also rules out the possibility of the effect arising from a unitary and 
immutable causal agent of Prakrti (be it a personal God or impersonal God) as such 
agent would lack necessary causal efficiency. In Chapter 2, by means of refuting the 
causal theory of the arising from another and by showing the logical absurdities if it did 
arise, I have shown, for the PrAsailgika, things do not arise from the cause that is 
distinctly "other" than the effect it produces. The production of the effect cannot be 
from the cause that is inherently different from the cause, otherwise anything could arise 
as effect from everything or anything could causally produce everything to arise. In 
Chapter 3, by means of refuting the syncretised causal account of Jainism, I have 
demonstrated that for the Prasangika things do not arise from both — the combined 
activities of the arising from the self and the arising from another. In the same chapter, 
through refuting Carvaka's noncausal view, I have also argued that, for the Prasatigika, 
things cannot arise without causes and conditions. So Nagarjuna's conclusion in his 
Mfilamadhyamakarika — 
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Neither from itself nor from another 
Nor from both, 
Nor without cause 
Does anything anywhere, ever arise" (MMK 1.1) 
does logically follow from the Prasatigika's refution of the all four causal theories. 
Arriving at the conclusion that things do not arise from these four alternative causal 
theses does not however complete the Prasangika Madhyamika philosophical project, 
for it still leaves unaccounted for the causation of things that are self-evident, 
everywhere around us. So in two latter chapters dependent arising is proposed as the 
alternative and arguably the only plausible causal explanation for the Prasangika 
Madhyamika. In Chapter 4 I have considered the Prasangika's specific reasons / proofs 
for rejecting essence and argued for the compatible relationship between 
essencelessness / emptiness and causation. In so doing I have shown that the 
Prasangika, while it does not have the essentialist or metaphysical thesis, nonetheless 
does indeed have dependent arising as its causal thesis. In Chapter 5 I have discussed 
the Prasangika's two central arguments — the arguments from the objective and the 
subjective dependent arising. The objective dependent arising argument demonstrates 
all external phenomena as dependently arisen — they arise through the collaborative 
network of causes and conditions and they cease due to the cessation of the causes and 
conditions of their existence. The argument from the subjective dependent arising has 
shown that all internal phenomena — minds and mental factors — as dependently arisen. 
Their arising is conditioned by ignorance and so forth as causes and conditions, so is 
their cessation conditioned by the cessation of ignorance, volitional formation etc as 
causes and conditions. Since dependent arising is identical to emptiness, its rejects any 
ultimate causal power, hence it is not open to the charges leveled against the causal 
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reificationism of Sarhkhya, Jainism, Buddhist Abhidharmikas and Svatantrika 
Madhyamikas. Dependent arising neverthless does offer a plausible causal explanation 
of how things or events really are produced causally on the conventional level, hence it 
is not open to the criticisms leveled against causal nihilism of Carvaka school. 
Dependent arising is rightly therefore described as the middle-path. It is clear then, at 
least for the Prdsangika Madhyamikas, the causal thesis that everything is dependently 
arisen is a sound causal proposition. 
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